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Selected Constitutional Issues Related
to Growth Management in the
State of Hawaii
By CARL M. SELINGER, JON VAN DYKE,
RnK AMANO, KEN TAKENAKA AND ROBERT YOUNG *
Introduction
In a democracy, issues concerning the rights of individuals and
the fairness of the state fall ultimately within the province of the judi-
cial system. In an effort to articulate concepts of social justice, courts
attempt to balance the various aspects of a legal controversy. As a re-
sult, the judiciary in the United States has laid a foundation of social
ideals that governs the lives of all Americans.
The courts have already addressed some of the legal ramifications
of growth control measures enacted by various states. This paper dis-
cusses these decisions in the context of the future of the State of Ha-
waii. The authors analyze the constitutionality of three measures
considered by Hawaii's legislature and its administrative agencies to
curtail population growth in the islands, specifically, residency require-
ments, land use controls and automobile limitations.
* Carl M. Selinger and Jon Van Dyke are Professors of Law at the University of Hawaii at
Manoa and were Team Leaders of the project that produced this article. Professor Van Dyke is
also a member of the faculty of Hastings College of the Law. Riki Amano, Ken Takenaka and
Robert Young are students at the University of Hawaii Law School and were employed by the
Hawaii Institute for Management and Analysis in Government during the original preparation of
this article. The authors wish to thank Herbert Kimura, Director of the Hawaii Institute for Man-
agement and Analysis in Government, and Eileen R. Anderson, Director of the Hawaii State
Department of Budget and Finance, for their assistance in the preparation of the original version
of this paper.
This article was written in a different form for the Hawaii Institute of Management and
Analysis in Government, a policy-planning agency in the Hawaii State Department of Budget and
Finance. The earlier version was published in a limited edition in a volume entitled GROWTH
MANAGEMENT ISSUES IN HAWAII: PROBLEMS-PERSPECTIVES-POLICY IMPLICATIONS 129-201
(1977), and was distributed to the 1978 Hawaii legislature. The authors have since updated this
piece for publication and its format has been revised for law review purposes. The authors also
wish to thank the editors of the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly for their work and support
in this revision process.
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The most direct way to limit population growth is to prohibit or
severely restrict any person from moving to a new locality. Thus, in
1977 and 1978 the Hawaii legislature enacted residency requirement
bills designed to decrease the number of people moving to Hawaii by
limiting access to public employment within the state.' The first section
of this article will examine the legal issues raised by these requirements.
Regulations affecting the use of land and the availability of housing are
means for reducing the effects of population growth, and such restric-
tions are usually primary concerns for persons considering emigration
to Hawaii. The land use policies of various state regulatory agencies
will thus be analyzed in the second section. Automobile limitations are
of paramount value in protecting the environment and are another
method of controlling growth. Consequently, the mandate of the Ha-
waii legislature respecting vehicle limitations2 and the response of the
state's Department of Transportation to that mandate will be consid-
ered extensively in the final section of this paper.
I. Legal Issues Related to Durational Residency
Requirements
A. Present Requirements in Hawaii: A Summary
The Hawaii Constitution and various state statutes have imposed
a number of durational residency requirements for specific occupa-
tions, professions and public offices.3 In 1977, however, the state legis-
1. 1978 Haw. Sess. Laws, act 101, see note 13, infra; 1977 Haw. Sess. Laws, act 211, codi-
fied at HAW. REV. STAT. tit. 7, § 78-1 (Supp. 1977) (repealed 1978), see note 7 infra.
2. HAW. REV. STAT. tit. 17, § 279A-9 (1976).
3. The list of professions and offices specifically so restricted is as follows:
One- Year Residency Requirement: Occupations
Heads of Departments HAW. REV. STAT. tit. 4, § 26-31 (1976)
Chiropractors HAw. REv. STAT. tit 25, § 442-2 (1976)
Dentists HAW. REV. STAT. tit. 25, § 448-9 (1976)
Fumigators HAW. REv. STAT. tit. 25, § 450-5 (1976)
Masseurs HAw. REV. STAT. tit 25, § 452-13 (1976)
Naturopaths HAw. REV. STAT. tit. 25, § 455-3 (1976)
Private Detectives and Guards HAw. REV. STAT. tit. 25, § 463-6 (1976)
Embalmers, Morticians & Funeral Directors HAw. REV. STAT. tit. 25, § 469-1 (1976)
One- Year Residency Requirement: Board and Commission Members
Motor Vehicle Industry Licensing Board HAw. REV. STAT. tit. 25, § 437-5 (1976)
Boxing Commission HAW. REV. STAT. tit. 25, § 440-2 (1976)
Cable Television Advisory Committee HAw. REV. STAT. tit. 25, § 440G-13 (1976)
Cemetery & Mortuary Board HAw. REV. STAT. tit. 25, § 441-18 (1976)
Chiropractic Board HAw. REV. STAT. tit. 25, § 442-3 (1976)
Collection Agency Board HAw. REV. STAT. tit. 25, § 443-2 (1976)
Contractors License Board HAW. REV. STAT. tit. 25, § 444-3 (1976)
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lature supplemented those laws with a new restrictive provision. In his
State-of-the-State Address on January 25, 1977, Governor George R.
Ariyoshi had identified "the problem of excessive population" as "cen-
tral to nearly every problem in our State"; he had therefore proposed
"a Constitutional amendment permitting States to establish residency
requirements for new arrivals for publicly supported programs such as
welfare assistance, public employment and housing."4
It was not clear whether the governor intended that the Hawaii
legislature should adopt durational residency requirements on its own
or whether representatives of the state should endeavor to have Con-
gress propose an amendment to the United States Constitution. The
governor had expressed the hope that "some of our sister states such as
California, New York, and Florida which attract a large number of
Contractors License Board
Board of Electricians & Plumbers
Elevator Mechanics' Board
Hearing Aid Dealers & Fitters Board
Board of Massage
Board of Examiners in Naturopathy
Board of Nurses







Board of Private Detectives & Guards
Board of Psychologists
Board of Veterinary Medicine
Three- Year Residency Requirement
State Senate
Hawaiian Homes Commission
HAw. REV. STAT. tit. 25, § 444-3 (1976)
HAW. REV. STAT. tit. 25, § 448E-2 (1976)
HAw. REv. STAT. tit. 25, § 448H-3 (1976)
HAW. REV. STAT. tit. 25, § 451A-3 (1976)
HAw. REv. STAT. tit. 25, § 452-4 (1976)
HAW. REV. STAT. tit. 25, § 455-4 (1976)
HAW. REv. STAT. tit. 25, § 457-3 (1976)
HAw. REv. STAT. tit. 25, § 457B-4 (1976)
HAW. REV. STAT. tit. 25, § 458-2 (1976)
HAw. REv. STAT. tit. 25, § 459-3 (1976)
HAW. REv. STAT. tit. 25, § 460-4 (1976)
HAw. REV. STAT. tit. 25, § 460J-2 (1976)
HAW. REV. STAT. tit. 25, § 461-2 (1976)
HAw. REv. STAT. tit. 25, § 462-3 (1976)
HAw. REV. STAT. tit. 25, § 463-2 (1976)
HAW. REV. STAT. tit. 25, § 465-4 (1976)
HAW. REV. STAT. tit. 25, § 471-3 (1976)
HAw. CONST. art. III, § 7
Hawaiian Homes Commission Act of 1920, §
202
Board of Professional Engineers, Archi-
tects, Surveyors & Landscape Architects HAw REv. STAT. tit. 25, § 464-6 (1976)
Real Estate Commission HAw. REv. STAT. tit. 25, § 467-3 (1976)
Five- Year Residency Requirement
Governor HAw. CONsT. art. IV, § I
Board of Barbers HAw. REv. STAT. tit. 25, § 438-3 (1976)
Board of Cosmetology HAw. REv. STAT. tit. 25, § 439-3 (1976)
Board of Examiners of Dentistry HAw. REv. STAT. tit. 25, § 448-5 (1976)
Ten- Year Residency Requirement
State Judges HAw. CONST. art. V, § 3
State Supreme Court Justices HAw. CONST. art. V, § 3
4. State-of-the-State Address by Hon. George R. Arlyoshi, delivered before the Ninth State
Legislature (Jan. 25, 1977).
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migrants would join us in this effort."5 He also envisioned, however,
that "[a]t times the program I am proposing will put this State in direct
confrontation with the present laws of this land and possibly even the
Constitution of the United States."'6
Whatever the governor's original intention, the Ninth State Legis-
lature did pass act 211, which imposed durational residency require-
ments for public employment in Hawaii.7 The act provided generally
that every position in state and local governmental service would be
filled by a person who has been a resident of the state for at least one
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. 1977 Haw. Sess. Laws, act 211, codfied at HAW. Rav. STAT. tit. 7, § 78-1 (Supp. 1977)
(repealed 1978). The act reads in its entirety:
SECTION 1. Section 78-1, Hawaii Revised Statutes, is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Sec. 78-1 Citizenship and residence of government officials and employees: exemp-
tions. (a) All officers, whether elective or appointive, in the service of the government of
the State or in the service of any county or municipal subdivision of the State shall be
citizens of the United States and residents of the State for at least three years immedi-
ately preceding their appointment.
(b) All employees in the service of the government of the State or in the service
of any county of [sic] municipal subdivision of the State shall be [residents of the State
and a citizen, national or permanent resident alien of the United States.] citizens nation-
als or permanent resident aliens of the United States and residents of e tatF for at
least one year immediately preceding their application for employment.
(c) For the purpose of obtaining services which are essential to the public inter-
est for which no competent person with the qualifications under subsection (b) applies
within forty-five days after the first publication of an advertisement of the position or a
notice of an examination therefor, which advertisement or notice has been published
more than once, and not oftener than once a week, in a newspaper of general circulation
in the State, a person without the qualifications may, uponpnor ceriation by the state
director of personnel services of [sic] the city and county director of civil service or the
county personnel director, whichever is applicable, and with the approval of the chief
executive officer for the State or the political subdivision concerned, be employed.
[(d) The requirement of subsection (b) of residence shall not apply to a female
resident who marries a non-resident and continues to reside in the State.]
(d) The requirement of residency, as defined under subsection (b) above, shall
not apply to a resident who was a resident of the State for at least one year immediately
before marrying a non-resident and who continues to reside in the State.
(e) For the positions involved in the performance of services in planning and
executing measures for the security of Hawaii and the United States, the employees shall
be citizens of the United States[.] m addition to meeting the requirement of residency in
subsection (b).
(f) The requirement of residency, as defined under subsection (b) and the re-
quirements of subsection (cl shall not apply to persons recruited by the University of
Hawaii under the authority of Chapter 304-11: orovided however, that all persons re-
cruited as Administrative/Professiona/TechnicaI personnel of the University of Hawaii
shall be subiect to the requirement of residency rovided further that appointment ofpersons to positions requiring highly, t=iai technical and sinicskl and
knowledge miay be -ad ith-ut o-sidration of residency
SECTION 2. Soverabiliw. If any provision of this Act, or the application thereof
to any person or circumstancf is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provi-
sions or applications of the Act which can be given effect without the invalid provision
or application, and to this end the provisions of this Act are severable.
Sc'rTON 3. Statutory material to be repealed is bracketed. New material is under-
scored. In printing this Act, the revisor of statutes need not include the brackets, the
bracketed material or the underscoring.
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year, unless no competent person who satisfied this requirement of resi-
dency applied for the position. The act further provided, however, that
"[t]he requirement of residency, as defined [in this act], . . . shall not
apply to. . . [faculty members] recruited by the University of Hawaii
.... "8 An exception was also made for state university administrative
positions "requiring highly specialized technical and scientific skills
and knowledge . . . ." No other exceptions were included. Further-
more, the act retained a three-year durational residency requirement
for "elective or appointive" state, county or municipal offices.' 0
On August 1, 1977, the case of Nehring v. AriyoshilI was filed in
federal district court on behalf of four plaintiffs by the American Civil
Liberties Union of Hawaii, challenging the constitutionality of act 211.
Later that month, Judge Samuel P. King issued a temporary injunction
restraining the enforcement of the statute.12 In 1978, the legislature re-
pealed the durational residency requirement imposed by act 211 and
adopted in its place act 101,13 which requires that the same public em-
SEcTiON 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
This legislation amended former HAw. REV. STAT. tit. 7, § 78-1 (1976). Subsection (a) of this prior
law had previously been held unconstitutional by the state supreme court. York v. State, 53 Haw.
557, 561, 498 P.2d 644, 647 (1972).
8. HAW. REv. STAT. tit. 7, § 78-1(f) (Supp. 1977).
9. Id.
10. HAw. REv. STAT. tit. 7, § 78-1(a) (1976).
I1. 443 F. Supp. 228 (D. Hawaii 1977).
12. In his subsequent opinion granting plaintiffs a preliminary injunction, Judge King con-
cluded that "[i]n my opinion, the denial of the opportunity to apply for public employment does
have a sufficient enough impact upon the right to travel to require that the statute be justified by a
compelling state interest." Id. at 237. The state offered two justifications: the need to control
population growth and the need to grant preferences in employment to long-term residents. Judge
King dismissed the latter contention, asserting that act 211 was "clearly not tailored to perform
this function." Id. at 239. As for the former contention, Judge King responded:
The central Constitutional objection to the approach proposed by the defendant is that
the state seeks to achieve its goal by keeping people out of Hawaii. Indeed, the defendant
admits that this is the purpose of the statute. If people migrate to Hawaii despite the
residency requirement then they. will continue to use more water and take up space. In
other words, the durational residency statute is an attempt to establish an interstate im-
migration policy. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that "to the extent the pur-
pose of [such a law] is to inhibit the immigration of [people] generally, that goal is
constitutionally impermissible." . . . This is not to say that the State is powerless to
attack the problems it faces. It can constitutionally seek to control growth through the
use of zoning and other, more enlightened tools of economic planning.
Id at 238 (citing Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 263-64 (1974); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969)).
13. 1978 Haw. Sess. Laws, act 101. The act reads, in its entirety:
SECTION 1. Section 78-1, Hawaii Revised Statutes, is amended to read:
Sec. 78-1 Citizenship and residence of government officials and employees: ex-
en& (a) All officers, whether elective or appointive, in the service of the govern-
ment of the State or in the service of any county or munici al subdivision of the State
shall be citizens of the United States and residents of the State for at least three years
immediately preceding their appointment.
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ployees covered by the 1977 act must simply be residents of Hawaii at
the time of their application for employment. However, in also granting
(b) All employees in the service of the government of the State or in the service
of any county or municipal subdivision of the State shall be citizens, nationals or perma-
nent resident aliens of the United States and residents of the State [for at least one year
immediately preceding] at the time of their application for employment.
"Resident" means a person who is physically present in the State at the time he
claims to have established his domicile in the state and shows his intent is to make
Hawaii his permanent residence. In determining this intent, the following factors shall be
considered:
(I) maintenance of a domicile or permanent place of residence in the state;
(2) absence of residency in another state.
(c) For the purpose of obtaining services which are essential to the public inter-
est for which no competent person with the qualifications under subsection [(a)] (h) ap-
plies within forty-five days after the first publication of an advertisement of the position
or a notice has been published more than once, and not oftener than once a week, in a
newspaper of general circulation in the State, a person without the qualifications may,
upon prior certification by the State director of personnel services or the city and county
director of civil service or the county personnel director, whichever is applicable, and
with the approval of the chief executive officer for the State or the political subdivision
concerned, be employed.
(d) The requirement of residency, as defined under subsection (b) above, shall
not apply to a resident who was a resident of the State [for at least one year immediately]
before marrying a non-resident and who continues to reside in the State.
(e) For the positions involved in the performance of services in planning and
executing measures for the security of Hawaii and the United States, the employees shall
be citizens of the United States in addition to meeting the requirement of residency in
subsection (b).
(f) The requirements of [residency, as defined under] subsection (b), (c). and (e)
[and the requirements of subsection (c)] shall not apply to persons recruited by the Un-
versity of Hawaii under the authority of [Chapter] section 304-11; provided that all per-
sons recruited as Administrative/Professional/Technical personnel of the University of
Hawaii shall be subject to the requirement of residency as defined under subsection 02)
and the requirement of subsection (g: provided further that appointment of persons to
positions requiring highly specialized technical [and] or scientific skills and knowledge
may be. made without consideration of residency.
() A preference shall be granted to State residents who have filed resident in-
come tax returns within the State or who have been claimed as a dependent on such a
return at the time of their application for employment with the State of any county or
municipal subdivision of the State.
For residents applying for positions covered by chapters 76 and 77, the preference
shall be accomplished as provided in section 76-23.
For residents anolvin, for positions not covered by chanters 7, and 77. the prefer-
ence shall be accomplslied gving first consider ion to such iden other
factors are relatively equal."
SECTION 2. Section 76-23, Hawaii Revised Statutes, is amended to read as
follows:
"Sec. 76-23 .illing va dan. All [vacancies and new positions in] vacant civil serv-
ice positions shall be filled in the manner prescribed in this part or in section 78-1.
Whenever there is a position to be filled, the appoint9gauthority shall request
the director of personnel services to submit a list of eligibles. director shall there-
upon certify a list of five or such fewer number as may be available, taken from eligible
lists in the following order: first the promotional lists, second the reemployment lists and
third the open-competitive lists; provided, that with respect to the eligibles under un-
skilled classes, the director shall certify all of the eligibles on such list. The director shall
submit eligibles in the order that they appear on the eligible list; provided that if the last
of the five eligibles to be certified is one of two or more eligibles who have identical
examination scores, such two or more eligibles shall be certified notwithstanding the fact
that more than five persons are thereby certified to fill a vacancy; and r rovided
that, for each eligible without resident preference certified. a resident wo has filed a
resident income tax return within the State or who has been claimed as a dependent on
such a return, as provided by section 78-1, shall also be certified.
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preferences among resident applicants to those who have previously
filed resident state income tax returns, act 101 retains a durational ele-
ment that has led the A.C.L.U. to threaten further litigation. 14
B. The Constitutionality of Durational Residency Requirements
L Yhe Traditional Tests
In order to evaluate the validity of act 211, it is necessary to
consider the permissibility of residency prerequisites in general. Dura-
tional residency requirements in Hawaii are unconstitutional if they are
inconsistent with the provisions of either the Hawaii Constitution, as
interpreted by the state's supreme court, or the United States Constitu-
tion, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.
In any case where there are three or more eligibles in one department whose
names appear as eligibles on an interdepartmental list, upon the request of the ap-
pointing authority of such department sucYthree or more names shall be certified to him
as eligibles on an intradepartmental eligible list; but where the interdepartmental list has
been m existence for more than six months and there are five or more persons in the
department qualified for the class, the department may request an intradepartmental
promotional examination, in which case the director shall hold either an interdepartmen-
tal or an intradepartmental promotional examination. The order in which eligibles are
placed on eligible lists shall be fixed by rule. The appointing authority shall make the
appointment only from the list of eligibles certified to him unless he finds no person
acceptable to him on the list certified by the director, in which case he shall reject the list
and request the director to submit a new list, in which event the director shall submit a
new list of eligibles selected in like manner, provided that the appointing authority
states his reasons in writing for rejecting each of the eligibles on the list previously certi-
fled to him by the director or, in case of the counties, by the civil service commission.
Eligible lists, other than reemployment lists, shall be effective for one year but this pe-
riod may be extended by the director.
An appointing authority may fill a vacant position in his department by promot-
ing any regular employee in the department without examination if the employee meets
the minimum class qualifications of the position to which he is to be promoted, and if the
position is in the same or related series as the position held by the employee: provided,
that when there is no material difference between the qualifications of the employees
concerned, the employee with the longest government [sic] service shall receive first con-
sideration for the promotion.
Any regular employee receiving any such promotion without examination shall
be ineligible for a second such promotion without examinationprior to his having com-
pleted one year of satisfactory service in the position to which he was so promoted, but
he may at any time be eligible for a promotion to any position through examination.
An employee filling a permanent position temporarily vacant may be given a
permanent appointment to the position if it later develops that the vacancy will be
permanent, provided he was originally appointed from an appropriate eligible list and
the appointing authority certifies that he has been performing the duties of the position
in a satisfactory manner.
SECTION 3. Severability. If any provision of this Act, or the application thereof
to any person or circumstances is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provi-
sions or applications of the Act which can be given effect without the invalid provision
or application, and to this end the provisions of this Act are severable.
SECTION 4. Statutory material to be repealed is bracketed. New material is un-
derscored. In printing this Act, the revisor of statutes need not include the brackets, the
bracketed material, or the underscoring.
SECTION 5. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
14. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, May 26, 1978, at A8, col. 3.
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The Hawaii Constitution contains due process and equal pro-
tection clauses identical to those found in the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.15 In the past, the Hawaii Supreme
Court has interpreted identical provisions of the state constitution as
imposing stricter limitations on governmental actions than those im-
posed by the United States Supreme Court.16 However, in Nehring v.
Aroyosh417 Judge King refused to abstain in order to permit the state
courts to apply the provisions of the Hawaii Constitution on the ground
that those provisions did not safeguard interests different from those
protected by the United States Constitution.' The Hawaii Constitution
also contains a section including "inalienable rights"-language that
originated in the Declaration of Independence of the United States, but
which was not repeated in the text of the federal Constitution:
All persons are free by nature and are equal in their inherent
and inalienable rights. Among these rights are the enjoyment of life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and the acquiring and possess-
ing of property. These rights cannot endure unless the people recog-
nize their corresponding obligations and responsibilities.19
Because many persons wishing to move to Hawaii may be moti-
vated by "the pursuit of happiness," this provision might provide an
15. HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 4.
16. See, e.g., State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 367-71, 520 P.2d 51, 58-59 (1974) (held right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under HAw. CONST. art. 1, § 5, requires that
intrusion into the personal privacy of individuals by the state be no greater than what is absolutely
necessary in light of surrounding circumstances, despite the United States Supreme Court's rul-
ings in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), and Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260
(1973), which upheld complete body searches incident to a lawful custodial arrest for driving
without a valid license); State v. Santiago, 53 Haw. 254, 261-67, 492 P.2d 657, 662-65 (1971) (held
custodial admission by a criminal defendant not properly apprised of his rights under Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), could not be used to impeach the defendant when he testifies at
trial, despite a contrary ruling in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); relied solely on HAw.
CONST. art. 1, § 8). Indeed, in State v. Texeira, 50 Haw. 138, 433 P.2d 593 (1967), the state
supreme court noted:
[Tihe Hawaii Supreme Court, as the highest court of a sovereign state, is under the obli-
gation to construe the state constitution, not in total disregard of federal interpretations
of identical language, but with reference to the wisdom of adopting those interpretations
for our state. As long as we afford defendants the minimum protection required by fed-
eral interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, we are
unrestricted in interpreting the constitution of this state to afford greater protection.
Id at 142 n.2, 433 P.2d at 597 n.2. Accord, Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975); Lego v.
Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967). See generally
Cades, Judicial Legislation in the Supreme Court of Hawai" A Brief Introduction to the "Knowne
Uncertaintie" of the Law, 7 HAw. B.J. 58, 61-62 (1970).
17. 443 F. Supp. 228 (D. Hawaii 1977). See notes 11-12 and accompanying text supra.
18. Id at 232-34 (citing Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de
Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 598 (1976)).
19. HAw. CoNsT. art. 1, § 2.
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independent basis for challenging the state's durational residency re-
quirements. 20 Indeed, with respect to durational residency require-
ments for employment, one court has observed that "The fight to work
for a living in one's chosen occupation is for most people a prerequisite
to the pursuit of happiness. ' 21 The Hawaii Supreme Court has not yet
adopted this approach; 22 in York v. State,23 it did not refer to the state
charter at all in its opinion holding an earlier three-year durational
residency requirement for public employment invalid under the United
States Constitution.24
20. Cf State v. Kantner, 53 Haw. 327, 337, 493 P.2d 306, 311-12 (1972) (Abe, J., concur-
ring), ceri. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972) (said "the right to the 'enjoyment of life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness' includes smoking of marijuana"); State v. Shigematsu, 52 Haw. 604, 609-10,
483 P.2d 997, 1000 (1971) (said "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" encompass the right of
movement and the right of association).
21. Keenan v. Board of Law Exam'rs, 317 F. Supp. 1350, 1362 (E.D.N.C. 1970). Cf.
Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843, 850 (D. Md. 1973), afad, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974) (cited the right to engage in a career as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness).
22. But cf State v. Shigematsu, 52 Haw. 604, 483 P.2d 997 (1971). That case involved a
challenge to HAw. REv. STAT. tit. 37, § 746-6 (1968) (repealed 1973), which made it a misde-
meanor to be present in a barricaded place that was being used for gambling purposes. The state
supreme court observed that the statute ran afoul of HAw. CONsT. art. 1, § 2, which was said to
encompass the freedoms of movement and association. Of these two freedoms it was asserted:
Also, we believe the importance of these fundamental rights is coming more and more to
the foreground in our modem mobile and fluid society. Thus, it would be utmost folly to
underestimate the influence of these two freedoms in our free society. Freedom would be
incomplete if it does not include the right of men to move from place to place, to walk in
the fields in the country or on the streets of a city, to stand under open sky in a public
park and enjoy the fresh air, to lie down on a public beach and enjoy a sunbath, to visit a
friend in his home and enjoy an evening together, and the right to associate with others
in the enjoyment of an avocation or a vocation.
52 Haw. at 610, 483 P.2d at 1001. It is not entirely clear whether this "freedom of movement"
espoused by the court encompasses interstate travel. Moreover, the state court has not clarified or
expanded this language in Shigematsu during succeeding years. See, eg., State v. Baker, 56 Haw.
271, 280-82 & n.21, 535 P.2d 1394, 1399-1401 & n.21 (1975) (refused to find possession of contra-
band marijuana to be a fundamental right); State v. Cotton, 55 Haw. 138, 142, 516 P.2d 709, 711-
12 (1973) (sustained law criminalizing the act of driving a motorcycle without wearing a safety
helmet).
23. 53 Haw. 557, 498 P.2d 644 (1972).
24. Id. at 561, 498 P.2d at 647. In York, the state circuit court had held that the three-year
residency requirement for state government employees, embodied in HAw. REV. STAT. tit. 7, § 78-
1(a) (1976) (amended 1977 and 1978), was an unconstitutional violation of the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, so its validity under that provision was the only issue
presented on appeal. The state supreme court found that "[t]he statute create[d] an arbitrary clas-
sification without rational relation to a public employee applicant's capabilities of performing
satisfactorily for the State." 53 Haw. at 560, 498 P.2d at 647. See also Potts v. Justices of Supreme
Court, 332 F. Supp. 1392 (D. Hawaii 1971). In that case, a three-judge federal district court held a
six-months durational residency requirement for taking the Hawaii bar examination invalid under
the federal Constitution without mentioning its possible invalidity under the state constitution. Id
at 1398.
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With regard to the latter charter, the critical provision for dura-
tional residency requirements is the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Probably the clearest statement of the tests
governing the application of this clause was articulated by the United
States Supreme Court in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County.25 That
decision struck down an Arizona durational residency requirement for
non-emergency free medical care,26 concluding that the requirement
creates an "invidious classification" that impinges on the right of in-
terstate travel by denying newcomers "basic necessities of life." Such
a classification can only be sustained on a showing of a compelling
state interest. Appellees have not met their heavy burden ofjustifica-
tion, or demonstrated that the State, in pursuing legitimate objec-
tives, has chosen means which do not unnecessarily impinge on
constitutionally protected interests.27
On the basis of this formulation, it seems reasonable to conclude that a
durational residency requirement will pass constitutional muster only if
25. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
26. In Maricopa County, one Henry Evaro, an indigent suffering from chronic asthma,
moved from New Mexico to Arizona in June of 1971. In July of that same year, he suffered a
severe respiratory attack and was placed in Memorial Hospital, a nonprofit community facility.
Memorial notified the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors, requesting that Evaro be trans-
ferred to a county hospital and that the county reimburse it for services already rendered. Under
Arizona law, while individual county governments had a mandatory duty to care for the indigent
sick, that duty was triggered only if the sick person had been a resident of the county for a year or
more. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 11-291, 11-297A (Supp. 1973-74) (repealed in part 1974). While
a state trial court had found the residency requirement invalid, the state supreme court reversed
this ruling, claiming that, absent such a requirement, the tax burden on county property owners
would be unduly severe and waiting periods to gain access to county medical facilities would be
prohibitively lengthy. Maricopa County v. Superior Court, 108 Ariz. 373, 376, 498 P.2d 461, 464
(1972).
27. 415 U.S. at 269. The "right to travel" does not explicitly appear in the United States
Constitution, but it has been given extensive recognition by the Court over the years. See, eg.,
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58
(1966); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1958); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908).
The right to travel freely within one's nation has also been recognized explicitly in article twelve
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which was written and approved by
the United Nations General Assembly in 1966. This Covenant has been formally ratified by forty-
two nations and is now a treaty binding those nations to the principles of human rights located
therein. President Carter signed the Covenant on behalf of the United States in October 1977 and
submitted it to the Senate for ratification in 1978. See Fischer, The International Protection of
Human Rights, in THE CHANGING UNITED NATIONS: OPTIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 45, 47
(D. Kay ed. 1977).
Article twelve of this Covenant reads as follows:
a. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory,
have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.
b. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.
c. The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except
those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security,
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it neither interferes with interstate travel by denying newcomers the
basic necessities of life nor penalizes such travel by denying some other
basic right, such as that of the franchise, 28 or if it is justified by a state
objective that is "legitimate" or "compelling" and that cannot be
served by other means that would result in less interference with inter-
state travel.
2 Effects of Durational Residency Requirements
The United States Supreme Court's decisions in cases involv-
ing constitutional challenges to residency requirements thus appear to
hinge on both the purpose for which the requirement has been imposed
and the nature of the deprivation exacted upon the immigrant plaintiff.
In Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,29 the Court construed its
earlier decision in Shapiro v. Thompson,30 which had held durational
residency requirements for state welfare benefits unconstitutional, as
one concerning efforts by a state to interfere with the constitutional
right of interstate travel by denying the migrant some of the "basic 'ne-
cessities of life.' "31 It did so despite the fact that two dissenting justices
in Shapiro had pointed out that the appellees in that case had found
alternative means of assistance. 32 The Court in Maricopa County found
public order (ordrepublic), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms
of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present
Covenant. ....
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 12, reprin'ed in 61 AM. J. INT'L LAW
870, 874-75 (1967). The word "State" in paragraph (a) is used to refer to the nation rather than
individual states within the nation, and thus this Article appears to guarantee a right to travel
freely within the United States. The full extent of the restrictions that are permitted under para-
graph (c) is unclear. The Soviet Union, for instance, does carefully restrict the travel of its citizens
even though it has formally ratified the International Covenant.
28. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972). Dunn invalidated a Tennessee law
requiring one year's residency within the state and three months' residency within a county as
prerequisites for registering to vote. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 2-201, 2-304 (1971) (amended 1972).
The Court found that the franchise is a "'fundamental political right, ...preservative of all
rights."' 405 U.S. at 336 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964)). It also concluded
that the constitutional right to travel was impinged by the Tennessee law, id at 338. No compel-
ling state interest was found to justify such infringements. See id at 343-60.
29. 415 U.S. 250 (1974). See notes 25-27 supra.
30. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
31. 415 U.S. at 259. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969).
32. Shapiro consolidated three separate suits. The first involved a pregnant unwed mother
denied assistance under Connecticut's Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) pro-
gram because she had not lived within the state for one year before filing her application. 394 U.S.
at 622-23. The second involved four appellees who had applied for and been denied either AFDC
assistance or benefits under an Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled program because
they failed to meet the District of Columbia's one-year residency requirement. Id at 623-25. The
third suit involved two appellees denied AFDC assistance under Pennsylvania's welfare program
because of a similar failure to meet a one-year prerequisite of residence. Id at 625-27. But as two
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it "clear that medical care is as much 'a basic necessity of life' to an
indigent as welfare assistance,"' 33 and thus refused to distinguish be-
tween emergency and non-emergency care.34
In contrast, the Court in Shapiro had stated that "waiting pe-
riod" requirements for "determining eligibility to vote, eligibility for
tuition-free education, to obtain a license to practice a profession, to
hunt or fish, and so forth .. .may not be penalties upon the exercise
of the constitutional right of interstate travel. '35 Although the Court
subsequently determined that durational residency requirements for
exercise of the franchise did penalize the right to travel, 36 it indicated in
T'andis v. Kline37 that a reasonable durational requirement (ie., one
year) could be imposed as a condition to obtaining low "resident" tui-
tion rates.38 Similarly, in Sosna v. Iowa,39 the most recent Supreme
Court decision dealing with durational residency requirements, the
Court upheld a one-year requirement for obtaining a divorce, in part
because the plaintiff was not "irretrievably foreclosed" but only
"delayed" in being able to obtain the benefit she sought.
40
dissenters noted, "[tihe burden [on interstate travel] is uncertain because indigents who are dis-
qualified from categorical assistance by residence requirements are not left wholly without assist-
ance. All of the appellees in these cases found alternative sources of assistance after their
disqualification." Id at 650 n.5 (Warren, C.J., dissenting, joined by Black, J.).
33. 415 U.S. at 259.
34. Id at 260-61.
35. 394 U.S. at 638 n.21.
36. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). See note 28 supra.
37. 412 U.S. 441 (1973). Viandis invalidated a Connecticut law requiring nonresidents en-
rolled in state universities to pay tuition fees at higher rates than state residents and creating an
irrebuttable presumption of nonresidency based on the legal address of a married student who was
outside the state at the time of application for admission or a single student who was outside the
state at any time during the preceding year. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-329(b) (Supp. 1969),
amended, 1971 Conn. Public Act No. 5, §§ 126(a)(2), 126(a)(3). The court deemed this presump-
tion violative of due process. 412 U.S. at 453.
38. 412 U.S. at 452-54. In support of this proposition, the Court cited Starns v. Malkerson,
326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), af/'d summaril,, 401 U.S. 985 (1971), which had upheld a
Minnesota tuition scheme similar to that involved in Viandis except that the former plan allowed
a student to rebut a presumption of nonresidency by submitting proof of domicile within the state
for one year. 412 U.S. at 452-53 n.9.
39. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
40. Id at 406. In Sosnm; the appellant, domiciled in New York, separated from her hus-
band in 1971. In August, 1972, she moved to Iowa and, in the following month, petitioned a
county court in that state for a dissolution of her marriage. The petition was denied pursuant to
IOWA CODE § 598.6 (1973) (amended 1976), which required that a person filing such a petition
have lived within the state at least one year. After noting that the states have virtually exclusive
authority over the regulation of domestic relations, 419 U.S. at 404, the Court held that "the state
interest in requiring that those who seek a divorce from its courts be genuinely attached to the
State, as well as a desire to insulate divorce decrees from the likelihood of collateral attack, re-
quires a different resolution of the constitutional issue presented than was the case in" Shapiro,
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Whether a durational residency requirement for employment
infringes upon a fundamental right for purposes of constitutional anal-
ysis is uncertain at best. The Supreme Court has indicated that a per-
son's ability to pursue his or her vocation is protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.4 1 In Massachusetts Board of Retirement v.
Murgia,42 however, the Court upheld a mandatory retirement law for
state police officers, stating: "This Court's decisions give no support to
the proposition, that a right of governmental employment per se is fun-
damental. ' 43 That this conclusion might in the future be limited to the
circumstances of the Murgia case itself-i e., to the "non-fundamental"
nature of retaining a government position instead of receiving a gov-
ernmental pension-is at least a possibility.
Moreover, state courts have differed over whether the ability
to obtain a position of public employment is a fundamental interest.
For example, in York v. State," the Hawaii Supreme Court referred to
a "fundamental interest" in "the right to work and thereby sustain
one's self and family," in striking down a durational residency require-
ment for public employment. 45 Similarly, in State v. Wylie,46 the
Dunn and Maricopa County. Id at 409. Viandis was distinguished because the Court asserted that
"[a]n individualized determination of physical presence plus the intent to remain, which appellant
apparently seeks, would not entitle her to a divorce even if she could have made such a showing."
Id
41. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
42. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
43. Id. at 313. In Murgia, Massachusetts law prescribed that uniformed state police officers
had to retire at age fifty. MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 32, § 26(3)(a) (1966). The Court concluded that
strict scrutiny of the classification thereby created was unnecessary because neither interference
with a fundamental right nor the disadvantaging of a suspect class was present. 427 U.S. at 312.
After finding no fundamental right, the Court also claimed no suspect class existed, asserting that
the aged "unlike, say, those who have been discriminated against on the basis of race or national
origin, have not experienced a 'history of purposeful unequal treatment' or been subjected to
unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities."
Id at 313. Under the rational basis test, the Massachusetts law was said to be permissible because
the physical ability necessary to adequate preformance as a police officer generally declines with
age. Id at 315. Even Justice Marshall's dissent did not assert that employment could be a funda-
mental right; rather, he argued that the age classification constituted "the height of irrationality."
Id. at 327. (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 13 (1977) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) (in a case involving state discrimination against certain classes of resident aliens,
the Chief Justice argued that the particular deprivation involved (the denial of state tuition schol-
arship benefits) should be distinguished from deprivations of "the essential means of economic
survival.")
44. 53 Haw. 557, 498 P.2d 644 (1972). See notes 23-24 and accompanying text supra.
45. Id at 560, 498 P.2d at 646. As noted earlier, see note 24 supra, the actual holding in
York was premised on the theory that the statute involved in that case could not be sustained
under even the rational basis level of scrutiny. The court in York had cited Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 330 (1972), to support the proposition that "a fundamental interest as the right to work
and thereby sustain one's self and family cannot be impinged absent a showing of a rational
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Alaska Supreme Court also held a one-year durational residency re-
quirement for public employment unconstitutional under the equal
protection clauses of both the state and federal constitutions, relying on
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Dunn v. Blumstein47 to
support the finding that the requirement served to "penalize" interstate
travel.48 The state court did not, however, undertake any analysis of
whether equal opportunity for public employment is a fundamental
right. Subsequently, in Hicklin v. Orbeck,49 the Alaska Supreme Court
reaffirmed its ruling in Wylie and once again struck down a one-year
durational residency requirement for employment connected with the
development of the Alaska pipeline.50 However, it also relied on the
relationship to a countervailing legitimate interest on the part of the State." 53 Haw. at 560, 498
P.2d at 646 (footnote omitted). Subsequently, however, in Nelson v. Miwa, 56 Haw. 601, 546 P.2d
1005 (1976), the Hawaii Supreme Court retrenched somewhat. Nelson involved a challenge to the
retirement policy announced by the Board of Regents of the University of Hawaii, which permit-
ted a succession of one-year appointments for faculty members between the ages of sixty-five and
seventy upon a demonstration that the services of the person in question were needed; upon reach-
ing age seventy, however, retirement was mandatory. Id at 602-03, 546 P.2d at 1007. The court
noted that in light of the fact that the state legislature had deemed age to be a suspect classifica-
tion, see HAw. REv. STAT. tit. 20, § 349-6 (a) (1976), and in light of the fact that the appellant was
not reappointed solely because his services were not determined to be essential, the university's
policy was "not reasonably related to a state interest and [was] totally arbitrary." 56 Haw. at 612,
546 P.2d at 1013. In the course of so holding however, the court said:
In Yorl this court, applying federal constitutional law as explained in Dunn v.
Blumstein ...unanimously agreed that the rational basis test was not "easily met by the
State," . . . in the case of "a fundamental interest (which) . . . cannot be impinged
absent a showing ...on thepart ofthe State." . . . The decision striking the require-
ment as unconstitutional was based upon the finding that a rational basis had not been
demonstrated. . . .The rationale set forth in Dunn has since been relegated to minority
status by San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez 411 U.S. 1, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 36 L. Ed.
2d 16 (1973). Accordingly, the reasoning in York is not presently viable as a matter of
federal constitutional law.
56 Haw. at 605 n.6, 546 P.2d at 1009 n.6 (emphasis in original).
46. 516 P.2d 142 (Alaska 1973).
47. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
48. 516 P.2d at 147-48. Indeed, the court in Wylie focused on the fact that the state's as-
serted goal in enacting the durational residency requirement in question (that of reducing unem-
ployment) could have been met by less drastic means. According to the court, it was not even clear
that the prerequisite of residence would further the asserted goal since unemployment in Alaska
was said to be caused by lack of education and vocational training. Id at 149 & n.14.
49. 565 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1977), rev'd in part, 46 U.S.L.W. 4773 (U.S. June 22, 1978). For
the United States Supreme Court's decision, see notes 316-332 and accompanying text infra.
50. The law in question, ALASKA STAT. § 38.40 (1976), required that all oil and gas leases,
easements for oil or gas pipelines and unitization agreements, contain a clause providing that
qualified Alaska residents be hired in preference to nonresidents. Based on these facts, the case
was distinguishable from Wylie in that: (1) pipeline jobs are mostly in rural areas and workers
therefore would not have to relocate themselves permanently, (2) the state initiated a training
program for unskilled Alaskans in connection with pipeline employment, a fact that caused it to
assert that the training program would be imperilled if employment preferences were not granted
and (3) the jobs covered by Alaska Hire were all of short durational nature. 565 P.2d at 164.
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Supreme Court's Murgia decision to support the assertion that there is
no "fundamental right to work."51 Perhaps the most persuasive prece-
dent to support a contention that durational residency requirements for
public employment neither interfere with nor penalize interstate travel,
however, is the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts in Town of Milton v. Civil Service Commission.52 The court in that
case upheld a preference for one-year residents of particular cities or
towns in being appointed to the police forces of those localities, stating:
We conclude that the denial of equal treatment on civil service
lists for possible appointments to local police forces does not rise to
the level of a denial of necessities of life or a fundamental political
right. It is not a penalty on the "right to travel" and therefore need
not be justified by a compelling State interest.
Nevertheless, the state court in Hicklin said that to the extent that the Alaska Hire Law defimed
bona fide residency too broadly, it was invalid. Id at 165. See generally Alleyne, Constitutional
Restraints on the Preferential Hiring of4askan Residentsfor Oil 4peline Construction, 2 U.C.L.A.-
ALASKA L. REv. 1 (1972); Comment, Durational Residency Requirements: The Alaskan
Experience, 6 U.C.L.A.-ALAsKA L. REv. 50 (1976).
51. 565 P.2d at 166. The Court distinguished three leading decisions finding that employ-
ment is a fundamental right, Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915); Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5
Cal. 3d 1, 17, 485 P.2d 529, 539, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 339 (1971); and Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State, 71
Cal. 2d 566, 579, 456 P.2d 645, 654, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77, 86 (1969). Purdy and Truax were rejected
because they involved laws discriminating against aliens, a suspect classification to begin with;
Sail'er Inn was differentiated because it involved employment discrimination based on sex. 565
P.2d at 166 n.ll. Indeed, after Purdy and Sailer Ini4 the California Supreme Court declined to
apply strict scrutiny to laws establishing qualifications for the practice of medicine. D'Amico v.
Board of Medical Exam'rs, 11 Cal. 3d 1, 23-24, 520 P.2d 10, 22-23, 112 Cal. Rptr. 786, 799-800
(1974). Accord Ganschow v. Ganschow, 14 Cal. 3d 150, 158, 534 P.2d 705, 709-10, 120 Cal. Rptr.
865, 870 (1975) (upheld statute creating two differently-treated classifications of child support
obligations); Naismith Dental Corp. v. Board of Dental Exam'rs, 68 Cal. App. 3d 253, 260, 137
Cal. Rptr. 133, 136 (1977) (sustained statute limiting the number of places at which a dentist could
practice unless the dentist was present at such place of practice at least 50% of the time during
which it is open for business); California Chiropractic Ass'n v. Board of Administration, 40 Cal.
App. 3d 701, 705, 115 Cal. Rptr. 286, 289 (1974) (upheld statute differentiating indirectly between
physicians and chiropractors by authorizing disability policies to carry provisions that physiother-
apeutic services would be paid only if rendered pursuant to the direction of one certified as a
physician).
As the Alaska court in Hicklin noted, Truax, which involved a successful challenge to a
state constitutional provision requiring employers to hire native-born citizens for at least 80% of
their work forces, is distinguishable because it concerned discrimination against aliens. Moreover,
even the United States Supreme Court in Truax observed that in some instances the state may
have a legitimate special interest in denying aliens access to some forms of employment. Truax v.
Raich, 233 U.S. at 39-40. Although the Court has questioned this "special interest" exception, see
Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 604 (1976), it
has most recently indicated that the exception is alive and well, in a case sustaining a New York
law limiting appointment of members of the state police force to United States citizens. Foley v.
Connelie, 98 S. Ct. 1067, 1072-73 (1978).
52. 365 Mass. 368, 312 N.E.2d 188 (1974).
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It is certainly true that the opportunity to earn a living is a fun-
damental right in our society. . . .But the right to earn a living is
not at stake here. It is an equally basic axiom that there is no right to
public employment. . . .Many years have passed since the decision
of this court in McAulffe v. Mayor and Bd of Aldermen of New
Bedford, 155 Mass. 216 [29 N.E. 517] (1892), but we believe Mr. Jus-
tice Holmes's observation at p. 220 of that opinion is still basically
true: "The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics,
but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."
... [T]he burden which this statutory scheme imposes on
those who have recently exercised their right to travel comes down to
this: they may be placed at a relative disadvantage to one-year res-
idents in the competition for a job to which they have no vested right.
We conclude that this burden cannot be regarded as such a drastic
deprivation of the rights of citizenship or the means of maintaining
life as to trigger the extremely vigorous scrutiny of legislation im-
plicit in the compelling State interest test.53
As a durational residency requirement, Hawaii's act 211 was par-
ticularly vulnerable to constitutional attack because it exempted a rela-
tively small number of highly specialized positions that would probably
be perceived as "occupations-of-choice," while it imposed the require-
ment of residency for the broad range of lower-level administrative and
public works jobs that would represent "last ditch" employment oppor-
tunities for persons who would otherwise have to seek welfare benefits
in order to survive.54 Yet, as a practical matter, this exemption would
appear to be the only sensible method to achieve the goal of reducing
significantly in-migration without also impairing seriously the state's
governmental functions. Framing the issue in Nehring v. Anyoshi5 5 as
"whether or not Hawaii's statute ...affects the right to travel in a
significant way," 56 Judge King concluded:
At the hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction, Robert
Schmitt, a state statistician called by the defendant, testified that ap-
proximately 12% of the jobs available in Hawaii are with the State
53. Id at 372-74, 312 N.E.2d at 192-93. The court therefore upheld the classification under
a "substantial relationship" test, defined as follows:
The public employer must, we think, in order to justify the use of a means of selection
shown to have a racially disproportionate impact, demonstrate that the means is in fact
substantially related to job performance. It may not, to state the matter another way, rely
on any reasonable version of the facts, but must come forward with convincing facts
establishing a fit between the qualification and the job.
Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 732 (1st Cir. 1972), quotedin 365 Mass. at 377, 312 N.E.2d at 195.
The court in Milton simply extended the standard used in certain racial classification cases to the
facts before it.
54. See notes 7-10 and accompanying text supra.
55. 443 F. Supp. 228 (D. Hawaii 1977). See notes 11-12 and accompanying text su ra.
56. Id at 235 n.15.
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and local government. There is no question in my mind that the
forced inability of a new resident to apply for 12% of the available
jobs is a penalty, particularly for those people who are generally
trained for work performed primarily by government. Even though
private jobs are still available, the universe of potential jobs is
smaller. . . With the exception of those with inherited wealth or
those who are on the public dole, employment is the only way for
people to provide themselves with the "necessities of life."57
One promising approach for protecting durational residency re-
quirements from constitutional attack would be to identify a "bench-
mark" of public benefits that Americans can generally expect to find in
moving from state to state thereby ensuring such that the denial to Ha-
waiian newcomers of only those benefits that exceed this benchmark
would neither interfere with nor penalize interstate travel. Thus, for
example, it could be argued that for the state to impose durational resi-
dency requirements for only those welfare benefits that exceed the na-
tional average, adjusted for Hawaii's higher cost of living, or for the
state to prescribe waiting periods for only the public works jobs in ex-
cess of those provided on an average per capita basis by other states,
would amount to no more than a policy of not encouraging dispropor-
tionate interstate travel to Hawaii.58
Careful analysis is also required to test the constitutional validity
of durational residency prerequisites for private occupations or profes-
sions that were established prior to act 211. Some courts have viewed
such requirements as interferences with fundamental rights,5 9 but
others have followed the suggestion in Shapiro v. Thompson 60 that they
need not be so viewed.61
57. Id. at 237 (footnote omitted).
58. By contrast, one unpromising approach is embodied in a proposal known as the Hawaii
Act, which would rigidly regulate movement to the islands and would restrict in-migration to
those who had jobs arranged before they arrive. Not only might this approach infringe the right of
interstate travel, see notes 25-28 and accompanying text supra, but it might also be violative of the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in that the restriction would seem to favor
professional people who might more easily be able to arrange for employment in advance over the
poor who rarely could. See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 175 (1941).
59. See, e.g., Lipman v. Van Zant, 329 F. Supp. 391, 401-04 (N.D. Miss. 1971) (invalidated
one-year residency requirement for taking the state bar exam); Webster v. Wofford, 321 F. Supp.
1259, 1262 (N.D. Ga. 1970) (same); Keenan v. Board of Law Exam'rs, 317 F. Supp. 1350, 1361-62
(E.D.N.C. 1970) (same).
60. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
61. See, e.g., Kline v. Rankin, 352 F. Supp. 292, 294-95 (N.D. Miss. 1972), rev'd on other
grounds, 489 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1974) (in dictum, indicated a ninety-day requirement for taking a
state bar exam would be valid); Suffling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257, 259-60 (D.N.M.), aqfjd
sub nom. Rose v. Bondurant, 409 U.S. 1020 (1972) (sustained six-months' residency requirement
for admission to the bar). Cf Shenfield v. Prather, 387 F. Supp. 676, 685-86 (N.D. Miss. 1974)
(sustained diploma privilege exempting graduates of state university law schools from taking bar
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The courts are also split as to the effect and constitutionality of
durational residency requirements for members of state boards and
commissions and for state offices. The Hawaii Supreme Court, for ex-
ample, in a decision after Shapiro v. Thompson62 but before Dunn v.
Blumstein63 and Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,' 4 applied a
"rational basis" test to uphold the constitutionality of a three-year resi-
dency requirement for the state house of representatives, without con-
sidering whether such a requirement interfered with or penalized
interstate travel.65 In contrast, the California Supreme Court held un-
constitutional a two-year durational residency requirement for mem-
bers of the city council of Santa Cruz in a decision rendered after
Dunn. The court noted with respect to the appropriate standard of
review:
[I]t is abundantly clear that durational residence requirements im-
posed as a precondition to candidacy for public office must be tested
by the "strict scrutiny" test, either because . . . the right to be a can-
exam); Huffman v. Montana Supreme Court, 372 F. Supp. 1175, 1182-83 (D. Mont.), affJ4 419
U.S. 955 (1974) (same); Aronson v. Ambrose, 366 F. Supp. 37, 43-44 (D.V.I. 1972) (sustained
requirement that bar applicant allege intent to reside and practice in Virgin Islands); Brown v.
Supreme Court of Virginia, 359 F. Supp. 549, 557-58 (E.D. Va. 1973) (sustained rule requiring
foreign attorneys seeking to practice in Virginia to become permanent residents and allege intent
to practice within the state).
62. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). See notes 30-33 and accompanying text supra.
63. 405 U.S. 330 (1972). See note 28 supra.
64. 415 U.S. 250 (1974). See notes 25-27 and accompanying text supra.
65. See Hayes v. Gill, 52 Haw. 251, 473 P.2d 872 (1970). Indeed, when the majority in
Hayes came to deal with issues raised under the federal Constitution, it dealt primarily with the
problems raised by the case of Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969). The court
observed that prior to Kramer, the classification in question would be justified by a state's asser-
tion of merely a rational basis. 52 Haw. at 258, 473 P.2d at 877. Kramer, however, had invalidated
a New York law prohibiting residents otherwise eligible to vote in state and federal elections from
voting in certain school district elections unless they either owned or leased realty in the district or
were parents of children in local public schools; in so doing, the Court focused upon whether the
law furthered a compelling state interest. 395 U.S. at 630-33. But the Hawaii Supreme Court
distinguished Kramer by observing that the case involved an infringement of the right to vote
whereas subsequently the United States Supreme Court had indicated in Turner v. Fouche, 396
U.S. 346, 362 (1970), that a statute restricting membership on school boards to freeholders need
only be justified by a rational basis. In his dissent in Hayes, Justice Levinson pointed out not only
that the United States Supreme Court had held that restrictions on a voter's choice of candidates
infringe the rights of that voter just as much as a flat denial of the franchise, Powell v. McCor-
mack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968), but also that, after
Turner, the Court had struck down a decision by the Maryland County Registry Board denying
the vote to occupants of federal enclaves within the state and, in doing so, had said that the
residence requirement thereby created would be subjected to a "close" level of scrutiny, Evans v.
Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 422 (1970). See 52 Haw. at 267-71, 473 P.2d at 882-84 (Levinson, J.,
dissenting). See generaly Gordon, The Constitutional Right to Candidacj; 91 POL. SCl. Q. 471
(1976). Even Justice Levinson, however, avoided discussion of possible impingements on the right
of interstate travel.
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didate for public office is a fundamental right in itself or because as
held in the cases discussed above, such restrictions on the right to be
a candidate impinge on other fundamental rights, namely the right to
vote and the right to travel.66
A subsequent decision by a three-judge federal district court in
New Hampshire, Chimento v. Stark;67 found otherwise, sustaining a
seven-year durational residency requirement for the office of state gov-
ernor. In that case, the court rested its ruling in part on a determination
that the requirement merely delayed the plaintiff s candidacy 68 and in
66. Thompson v. Mellon, 9 Cal. 3d 96, 102, 507 P.2d 628, 633, 107 Cal. Rptr. 20, 25 (1973).
As authority for the proposition that the right to hold office is "fundamental," the state supreme
court cited its own prior decisions in Zeilenga v. Nelson, 4 Cal. 3d 716,484 P.2d 578, 94 Cal. Rptr.
602 (1971) (holding five-year residency requirement for board of supervisors imposed by the Butte
County charter infringed a fundamental right in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment) and
Camara v. Mellon, 4 Cal. 3d 714, 484 P.2d 577, 94 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971) (holding three-year
residency requirement for councilmanic candidates in Santa Cruz invalid). 9 Cal. 3d at 98-99, 507
P.2d at 630-31, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 22-23. It also cited the decision of Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134
(1972), in which it was stated with respect to a Texas scheme exacting filing fees of candidates:
[T]he Court has not heretofore attached such fundamental status to candidacy as to in-
voke a rigorous standard of review. However, the rights of voters and the rights of candi-
dates do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that affect candidates always have
at least some theoretical, correlative effect on voters. . . . [t]he Texas system creates
barriers to candidate access to the primary ballot, thereby tending to limit the field of
candidates from which voters might choose.
Because the Texas filing-fee scheme has a real and appreciable impact on the exercise of
the franchise, and because this impact is related to the resources of the voters supporting
a particular candidate, we conclude..- . that the laws must be "closely scrutinized" and
found reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of legitimate state objectives in order
to pass constitutional muster.
Id at 142-44. From this language, it might be inferred that restrictions on candidacy are not
subject to strict scrutiny. However, the California Supreme Court chose instead to rely on a
number of federal decisions holding to the contrary, either because the challenged restrictions
impinged the right to vote, the right to travel or both. See e.g., Green v. McKeon, 468 F.2d 883,
884-85 (6th Cir. 1972) (invalidated two-year residency requirement for all elective offices in the
city of Plymouth, Michigan); Draper v. Phelps, 351 F. Supp. 677, 681 (W.D. Okla. 1972) (sus-
tained six-months' prerequisite for candidates to state's house of representatives); Manson v. Ed-
wards, 345 F. Supp. 719, 721-24 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (upheld provision requiring all candidates for
Detroit's city council to be at least twenty-five years of age); Wellford v. Battaglia, 343 F. Supp.
143, 145-48 (D. Del. 1972) (invalidated residency requirement of five years for candidates seeking
the mayoralty ofthe city of Wilmington); McKinney v. Kaminsky, 340 F. Supp. 289, 294-95 (M.D.
Ala. 1972) (struck down five-year prerequisite for those seeking to serve as county commissioner
of Montgomery County); Mogk v. City of Detroit, 335 F. Supp. 698, 700-01 (E.D. Mich. 1971)
(struck down three-year residency requirement for members of city's charter revision commis-
sion); Bolanowski v. Raich, 330 F. Supp. 724, 726-30 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (invalidated three-year
prerequisite for candidates for the mayoralty of the city of Warren); Hadnott v. Amos, 320 F.
Supp. 107, 119 (M.D. Ala. 1970), af'd mem., 401 U.S. 968 (1971) (upheld one-year residency
requirement for candidates for circuit judgeships); Stapleton v. Clerk for City of Inkster, 311 F.
Supp. 1187, 1189 (E.D. Mich. 1970) (invalidated requirement that candidates for all elective or
appointive city offices have been freeholders for at least two years).
67. 353 F. Supp. 1211 (D.N.H.), aff'dmem., 414 U.S. 802 (1973).
68. 353 F. Supp. at 1216.
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part on the following finding:
[B]ecause of the nature of the residency requirement, the relationship
between it and the right to travel is indirect and remote. We agree
with Judge Doyle, concurring in Draper v. Phelps, 351 F. Supp. 677
(W.D. Okl. 1972):
. . . the right to public office can[not] be equated to the
right to vote in relationship to the right to travel. Candidacy
for public office is quite different from voting, and one does
not travel from one place to another contemplating that he
will offer himself to the voters for election to state office.
Candidate durational residency requirements do not "penalize"
the right to travel or force a person to choose between that right
and a "basic" or "fundamental" right. It cannot be seriously ar-
gued that the inability to run for Governor is a real impediment
to interstate travel. In Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, the residency
requirement for voters in fact disenfranchised all those who
moved into the State within the proscribed time limit. The mem-
bers of such a class were and had the potential of being numer-
ous. While the Governorship of New Hampshire may be a
coveted prize, it is one that is seriously sought after by only a
very few.6 9
The court also pointed out that the plaintiff could still run for "lesser"
offices and distinguished decisions holding unconstitutional durational
residency requirements for such lesser offices. 70 The Chimento deci-
sion, which also justified the durational residency requirement at issue
on the basis of the state's objectives, was affirmed without opinion by
the Supreme Court.71
More recent decisions have either taken the position that the de-
nial of candidacy for public office does not interfere with interstate
travel or have adopted the Chimento court's higher office/lesser office
distinction.72 In the case of Henderson v. Fort W4brth Independent
69. Id. at 1218.
70. Id at 1216 & n.10.
71. Chimento v. Stark, 414 U.S. 802 (1973).
72. See, e.g., Billington v. Hayduk, 439 F. Supp. 975, 978-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (struck down
five-year resident freeholder requirement for office in Westchester County; utilized Chimento's
distinction about lesser offices); Russell v. Hathaway, 423 F. Supp. 833. 835 (N.D. Tex. 1976)
(upheld one-year residency prerequisite for school district trustee candidates; said its decision was
governed by Chimento); Sununu v. Stark, 383 F. Supp. 1287, 1290-92 (D.N.H. 1974), aidmem.,
420 U.S. 958 (1975) (upheld seven-year residency prerequisite for state senators; found, under
Chimento and other cases, no infringement of the right to travel and sufficient compelling state
interests); Alexander v. Kammer, 363 F. Supp. 324, 326 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (five-year and two-year
prerequisites for city commissioners' posts invalidated; used Chimentds leser office distinction);
Gilbert v. State, 526 P.2d 1131, 1135 (Alaska 1974) (upheld three-year requirement for candidacy
for the state legislature; found no substantial interference with the right to travel); Cabnman v.
Eckerty, 40 Il. App. 3d 180, 181, 351 N.E.2d 580, 581 (1976) (sustained one-year prerequisite for
aldermanic candidates; concluded candidacy is not a fundamental right); Lawrence v. City of
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School District,73 however, the court seemed to circumscribe signifi-
cantly the concept of a higher office to which a durational residency
requirement could constitutionally apply:
[A]s pointed out by the court in Chimento, plaintiff there was
eligible for a large number of public offices below that of governor.
Thus, he was not completely barred from offering himself for service
in state government. In the instant case, however, the position of
school board trustee is the only one available for a person wishing to
inject him or herself into the management and control of the local
school district. There are no lesser offices available to satisfy this par-
ticular desire to serve the public. 74
Accordingly, the court invalidated a three-year school board residency
requirement as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. 75 As demon-
strated by the above cases, the constitutionality of Hawaii's residency
requirements for administrative positions and public offices may, in
many instances, be uncertain.
3. Objectives of Durational Residency Requirements
The United States Supreme Court has analyzed the constitu-
tionality of several governmental objectives that have been offered as
justifications for durational residency requirements that interfere with
or penalize interstate travel, each of which merits separate discussion.
The first objective is the exclusion of poor immigrants. In Shapiro v.
Thompson,76 the Court flatly declared that "the purpose of deterring
the in-migration of indigents cannot serve as justification for the classi-
fication created by the one-year waiting period, since that purpose is
constitutionally impermissible.' ' 77 The second objective is saving
Issaquah, 84 Wash. 2d 146, 150-52, 524 P.2d 1347, 1349-50 (1974) (upheld one-year councilmanic
requirement; utilized Chimento's lesser office distinction).
73. 526 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1976). The case involved a requirement that candidates for the
Fort Worth school board must have been freeholders in the school district for one year and quali-
fied voters of that district for at least three years; since under Texas law, eligibility for general
registration is conditioned upon residence within the state for one year, the local regulation had
the effect of lengthening normal registration requirements. Id. at 289-90 & n.2.
74. Id at 292-93.
75. Id. at 293. Later cases have, however, distinguished Henderson. See, e.g., Daves v. City
of Longwood, 423 F. Supp. 503, 506 (M.D. Fla. 1976) (sustained one-year requirement for candi-
dates for city council; held said requirement, unlike that in Henderson, did not extend general
residency requirements imposed by the state); Fleak v. Allman, 420 F. Supp. 822, 824 n.4 (W.D.
Okla. 1976) (upheld six-months' residency prerequisite for state house of representatives; pointed
out that this requirement was not as "long term" as the one in Henderson).
76. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
77. Id at 631. See also Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 263-64 (1974).
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money for the taxpayer. The Court has also rejected this purported
justification:
[A] State may not protect the public fisc by drawing an invidious
distinction between classes of its citizens ...so appellees must do
more than show that denying free medical care to new residents
saves money. The conservation of the taxpayers' purse is simply not a
sufficient state interest to sustain a durational residence requirement
which, in effect, severely penalizes exercise of the right to freely mi-
grate and settle in another State.78
The third justification concerns the deterrence of the in-migration of
indigents who relocate in order to obtain greater public benefits. The
Court has rejected this purported justification with respect to residency
prerequisites both for welfare benefits79 and for non-emergency medi-
cal care.80 In the latter instance, the Court took the following position:
"An indigent who considers the quality of public hospital facilities in
entering the state is no less deserving than one who moves into the state
in order to take advantage of its better educational facilities. 81
Fourth, there are also miscellaneous administrative justifications.
The Court has held illegitimate the objective of reserving essential state
benefits for persons who have contributed to a state by paying taxes.82
It has also found durational residency requirements too drastic to serve
as a "rule of thumb" for the determination of actual residency8 3 or the
.prevention of fraud.84 Similarly, durational residency requirements are
viewed as irrelevant to budgetary planning.85 Moreover, the Court has
found "no rational basis" for distinguishing between new and old re-
sidents in order to withhold public benefits in an effort to induce per-
sons to return to the labor force.86 The major exception to this rule has
been the decision in Starns v. Malkerson,87 which held that non-res-
78. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 263 (1974). See Rivera v. Dunn,
329 F. Supp. 554, 558-59 (D. Conn. 1971), affdmem., 404 U.S. 1054 (1972).
79. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631-32 (1969).
80. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 264 (1974).
81. Id.
82. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 632-33 (1969).
83. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 268 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330, 349-52 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 636 (1969).
84. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 268 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330, 345-49 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 637 (1969).
85. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 269 (1974); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 634-35 (1969).
86. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 637-38 (1969).
87. 401 U.S. 985 (1971) summarily aflg 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970). See note 38
supra.
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idents can be charged more by state universities.88 Although the Court
did not issue an opinion in that case, it was apparently influenced by
the fact that state universities are supported by state taxpayers and the
belief that those individuals should not be "penalized" with floods of
out-of-state applicants if they decide to support a university system su-
perior to that of neighboring states.8 9
The fifth rationale of excluding persons who do not have the "lo-
cal viewpoint" has also been considered by the Court. In the context of
striking down durational residency requirements for voting, the Court
has made it clear that the maintenance of a homogeneous local outlook
is not a permissible state objective.90 The federal government and vari-
ous states do, however, have a one-year residency requirement for serv-
ing on juries, and every court that has considered the constitutionality
of such requirements has upheld them.91 The stated reason for includ-
ing a residency requirement in the federal jury statute was to assure
"some substantial nexus between a juror and the community whose
sense of justice the jury as a whole is expected to reflect. ' 92 This ratio-
nale could be applied persuasively in the context of residency prerequi-
88. The lower court in Starns stated:
We believe that once the law affords recognition to the right of a State to discrim-
inate in tuition charges between a resident and nonresident, that right to discriminate
may be applied reasonably to the end that a person retains a nonresident classification
for tuition purposes until he has completed a twelve-month period of domicile within the
State. We believe that the State of Minnesota has the right to say that those new residents
of the State shall make some contribution, tangible or intangible, towards the State's
welfare for a period of twelve months before becoming entitled to enjoy the same privi-
leges as long-term residents possess to attend the University at a reduced resident's fee.
Accordingly, we hold that the regulation requiring a one-year domicile within the State
to acquire resident classification for tuition purposes at the University is constitutionally
valid.
Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234, 241 (D. Minn. 1970).
89. See id. at 240-41. See also Clarke v. Redeker, 259 F. Supp. 117, 123 (S.D. Iowa 1966);
Kirk v. Board of Regents, 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 444-45, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260, 269 (1969), appeal
dismissed, 396 U.S. 554 (1970). Indeed, Hawaii has similar limitations. By statute, tuition for a
nonresident at the state university can be no less than twice that charged to residents; resident
status is determined by (a) proof of physical presence within the state for twelve preceding months
and (b) some indication of intent to resident permanently in the state, such as registration to vote,
payment of taxes or so on. See HAw. REV. STAT. tit. 18, § 304-4 (1976).
90. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 354-56 (1972).
91. See United States v. Owen, 492 F.2d 1100, 1109 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Perry,
480 F.2d 147, 148 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Ross, 468 F.2d 1213, 1215-16 (9th Cir. 1972),
cer. denied, 410 U.S. 989 (1973); United States v. Gast, 457 F.2d 141, 143 (7th Cir.), cert. denie,
406 U.S. 969 (1972); United States v. Duncan, 456 F.2d 1401, 1406 (9th Cir. 1972); United States
v. Armsbury, 408 F. Supp. 1130, 1134 (D. Or. 1976); Craig v. Wyse, 373 F. Supp. 1008, 1010 (D.
Colo. 1974); Williams v. State, 51 Ala. App. 1, 4,282 So. 2d 349, 352 (1973); Hampton v. State, 569
P.2d 138, 149 (Alaska 1977); Adams v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 55, 62-63, 524 P.2d 375,380, 115
Cal. Rptr. 247, 252 (1974); Reed v. State, 292 So. 2d 7, 10 (Fla.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 995 (1974).
The federal provision is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
92. [1968] U.S. CODE & CONG. NEws 1796.
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sites for government jobs that do require knowlege of local life-styles,
such as police officers or clerk-receptionists in satellite city halls.93
The sixth rationale of limiting political rights, public positions and
private professions and occupations to persons who are knowledgeable
about local conditions and issues was analyzed in Dunn v. Blumstein.94
The Court in that case found that, "as devices to limit the franchise to
knowledgeable residents, the conclusive presumptions of durational
residency are too crude. '95 It proceeded to state that:
The classifications created by durational residence requirements ob-
viously permit any longtime resident to vote regardless of his knowl-
edge of the issues-and obviously many longtime residents do not
have any. On the other hand, the classifications bar from the
franchise many other, admittedly new, residents who have become at
least minimally, and often fully, informed about the issues. Indeed,
recent migrants who take the time to register and vote shortly after
moving are likely to be those citizens, such as appellee, who make it a
point to be informed and knowledgeable about the issues.96
This "crudeness" rationale has been applied by the California Supreme
Court to strike down durational residency requirements for public of-
fices generally, 97 and by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit to hold durational residency requirements for school
board members unconstitutional. 98 Similarly, in Potts v. Honorable Jus-
tices of Supreme Court of Hawaii,99 a federal district court in Hawaii
found that "an inference that an 'understanding' of Hawaii's 'unique-
ness' has any valid relevance to an applicant's. . . ability to be a sound
lawyer here after admission is untenable."' 100
In Town of Milton v. Civil Service Commission, 01 however, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found that the factors of
greater familiarity with a city's or town's geography and its people jus-
93. See generaly J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COM-
MITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 71-82 (1977).
94. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
95. Id at 360.
96. Id at 358.
97. See Thompson v. Mellon, 9 Cal. 3d 96, 103, 507 P.2d 628, 635, 107 Cal. Rptr. 20, 25, 27
(1973). Seenote 66 and accompanying text supra. See also York v. State, 53 Haw. 557, 560-61, 498
P.2d 644, 646-47 (1972).
98. See Henderson v. Fort Worth Independent School Dist., 526 F.2d 286, 292 (5th Cir.
1976). See notes 73-75 and accompanying text supra.
99. 332 F. Supp. 1392 (D. Hawaii 1971).
100. Id at.1398. See also Lipman v. Van Zant, 329 F. Supp. 391, 400-01 (N.D. Miss. 1971);
Webster v. Wofford, 321 F. Supp. 1259, 1261-62 (N.D. Ga. 1970); Keenan v. Board of Law
Exam'rs, 317 F. Supp. 1350, 1369 (E.D.N.C. 1970).
101. 365 Mass. 368, 312 N.E.2d 188 (1974). See notes 52-53 and accompanying text supra.
[Vol. 5
tified a one-year residency requirement for eligibility to serve as a po-
lice officer in that locality, even if the requirement interfered with
interstate travel:
The preappointment preferences improve the chances that new ap-
pointees will possess the desired characteristics from the very outset
of their service rather than requiring a "breaking-in" period of up to
two years before the same degree of proficiency will be achieved by
new residents. We think it is clear that thispreference is rationally re-
lated to the legitimate, indeed critical, public objective of preserving
public order and safety. Even were we to assume that the ramifica-
tions of this policy affecting the "right to travel" were such that a
compelling State interest were required, we would be hardpressed to
deny that the improvement in the effectiveness of police service is
such an interest. "[T]he obligation of the government to protect life,
liberty, and property against the conduct of the indifferent, the care-
less, and the evil-minded may be regarded as lying at the very foun-
dation of the social compact."
It is true that the statute attacked here may grant a preference to
some applicants who lack the desired qualities while denying it to
some who are amply qualified. But this does not negate the reasona-
bleness of the classification. . . . It is impossible to draw legislative
classifications to mathematical perfection, and the Fourteenth
Amendment does not require such precision.102
Durational residency requirements for state offices have also been sus-
tained on the basis of a perceived need for enhanced knowledge of the
state by the Alaska Supreme Court in Gilbert v. State:103
The asserted interest of the state in assuring that those who
govern are acquainted with the conditions, problems, and needs of
those who are governed cannot be questioned. Because Alaska is
unique in its geography, the ethnic diversity of its peoples and the
character of its economy, this interest may well assume even greater
importance here than in many other states. A legislator is required to
consider and vote upon matters which affect many parts of the state
and involve many segments of its economy and its peoples. It is
therefore not unreasonable for the state to provide for a three-year
period in which a new resident may become familiar with his state
before he may legislate solutions to its problems.
We see no viable alternative means of advancing these impor-
tant interests alleged by the state. Appellant suggests that these inter-
ests may be met by imposing some sort of subjective test upon
potential legislators. We disagree. To create a subjective test of can-
102. Id at 376, 312 N.E.2d at 194-95 (quoting Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U.S. 313, 322 (1911))
(emphasis added).
103. 526 P.2d 1131 (Alaska 1974). The court in this case sustained a three-year residency
requirement on candidacy for the state legislature.
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didates' knowledge, understanding or character would necessarily
place undue power in the hands of those who would implement such
a standard. 104
This argument for upholding durational residency requirements for
public offices is bolstered by the United States Constitution itself,
which contains a fourteen-year residency requirement for the Presi-
dency, 10 5 a nine-year citizenship requirement for the Senate' °6 and a
seven-year citizenship requirement for the House of Representatives. 10 7
It is also important to note that durational residency as an indicator of
familiarity with a state's peoples and problems might more readily be
upheld as a valid employment criterion if it were legislatively identified
as merely one factor in an evaluation of a prospective employee's quali-
fications. However, much would depend on the weight accorded to this
one factor. Hawaii's act 101, for example, which provides that residents
who have previously filed state income tax returns shall receive first
consideration over other residents for non-civil service positions, pro-
vided that all other factors are relatively equal, would appear to accord
durational residency minimal weight.
The seventh proffered justification of protecting the integrity of
state legal institutions and the effectiveness of their judgments has not
been fully explored. Although it is not clear from the opinion in Sosna
v. Iowa'0 8 that the Court was insisting on a "compelling state interest"
to justify the durational residency requirement for obtaining a divorce,
it emphasized "the State's parallel interests both in avoiding officious
intermeddling in matters in which another State has a paramount inter-
est, and in minimizing the susceptibility of its own divorce decrees to
collateral attack."' 10 9
Two other possible justifications for durational residency require-
ments should be considered, although the Supreme Court has not yet
passed directly upon either of them. The first is the policy of mono-
polizing employment opportunities for longer-term state residents. This
objective was set forth in a conference committee report on Hawaii's
act 211, which stressed the "insular character of our State" and its "un-
precedented type of cultural environment and particular life-style
104. Id at 1135-36. Cf. Chimento v. Stark, 353 F. Supp. 1211, 1214-15 (D.N.H.), aff'd
mem., 414 U.S. 802 (1973) ("The propriety of legal lines which are drawn and classifications
which are made cannot depend on precise mathematical equations.")
105. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
106. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
107. Id art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
108. 419 U.S. 393 (1975). See notes 39-40 and accompanying text supra.
109. Id at 407.
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which may cause adjustment difficulties" for emigrants, as barriers to
out-migration to seek employment opportunities on the mainland. 110 In
York v. State,I I' the Hawaii Supreme Court referred to the objective of
monopolizing employment, but concluded without discussion that it
did not justify a durational residency requirement for public jobs.1 2
Thereafter the Alaska Supreme Court found the use of a durational
residency requirement to reduce local unemployment neither legitimate
nor a means that was calculated to interfere the least with interstate
travel:
We recognize the state's valid interest in upgrading Alaska's
human resources, and in reducing the level of unemployment within
the state. It does not appear, however, that the employment prefer-
ence furthers the purpose of reducing unemployment except by de-
terring the in-migration of persons from other states. The personnel
rules in question do not increase the number of available state em-
ployment opportunities, but simply limit the universe of persons who
may compete for them. To the extent that the personnel rules "lower
unemployment" by fencing out competition from other states, the
rules impermissibly discriminate against persons who have recently
traveled to the state. . . .The personnel rules creating an employ-
ment preference are poorly "tailored" to achieve the objective of
lowering state unemployment. There are certainly available to the
state other means for lowering unemployment which impose a lesser
burden on the constitutionally protected right to interstate travel. 1 3
In Hicklin v. Orbeck,"4 the Alaska Supreme Court reaffirmed this
view, pointing out that:
The extent to which the Alaska Hire Law in fact benefits unem-
ployed Alaskans and those in job training is questionable. Alaska
Hire does not distinguish among those who have been one-year re-
sidents; it gives all of them an absolute preference over those who are
not one-year residents. A lifelong Alaskan employed in a private
business or the public sector would be entitled to preference under
Alaska Hire if he sought a new job. An unemployed person, or one
who had just completed a private or public training course qualifying
him for pipeline or petroleum employment, but who had taken an
extended trip outside the state eleven months earlier, would be un-
able to obtain preference.
While under strict scrutiny the correlation between the classifi-
cation made by the statute and the goals sought to be achieved need
110. CONFERENCE COMM. REP. No. 11 ON S.B. No. 1350, S. Doc. No. 1, H. Doc. No. 2
(April 14, 1977).
111. 53 Haw. 557, 498 P.2d 644 (1972). See notes 23-24 and accompanying text supra.
112. Id. at 561 n.5, 498 P.2d at 647 n.5.
113. State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142, 149 (Alaska 1973) (footnotes omitted). See notes 46, 48
and accompanying text supra.
114. 565 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1977). See notes 49-51 and accompanying text supra.
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not be perfect, it must be sufficiently strong that the classification is
the least drastic means to achieve those ends. We cannot say that a
one-year durational residency requirement is the least drastic means
available to the state in its quest for reduced unemployment and a
stabilized economy. Therefore, we hold that AS 38.40.090(l)(A) vio-
lates the equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitu-
tions. The challengers point out that the least drastic, and also the
most effective, means to help the unemployed and recent trainees to
find jobs, is to give an employment preference only to the unem-
ployed and recent trainees."15
Finally, in Nehring v. Ariyoshi,116 Judge King expressed skepticism
about the legitimacy of reserving positions in public employment for
Hawaiian residents who would have difficulty securing work on the
mainland:
In York v. State ... the State argued that a three-year residency
requirement for public employment guaranteed that only "qualified"
people would be hired. The Hawaii Supreme Court found this irra-
tional and struck down the statute under the traditional equal protec-
tion test . . . Now the state argues that the statute seeks to protect
the less-qualified person!" 7
However, in the absence of evidence' 1 8 tending to show the number of
115. Id at 164-65 (footnotes omitted). The Alaska court proceeded to observe that since
employment is not a fundamental right and nonresidents do not comprise a suspect classification,
rational basis scrutiny would be utilized in judging the validity of the remainder of the Alaska
Hire law. Id at 167. But the rational basis test under the state constitution required that a classifi-
cation bear a fair and substantial relation to a permissible state interest, see State v. Erickson, 574
P.2d 1, 11-12 (Alaska 1978); Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 362 (Alaska 1976), whereas the same
test under the federal Constitution required that challenged economic or social welfare legislation
be upheld if the legislature could have had any conceivable basis to believe that it furthered a state
interest, whether or not that basis actually occurred to the lawmakers, see City of New Orleans v.
Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1976); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.. 348 U.S. 483, 487-89
(1955). However, the United States Supreme Court has also used the "substantial rationality"
approach when important interests are at stake, as in cases involving claims of gender-based dis-
crimination. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
See generally Gunther, Foreword- In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: 4 Model
for a Newer EqualProtection; 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1971). The Alaska court applied this "substan-
tial rationality" test to the statute before it, reasoning that the residency requirement of the Alaska
Hire law limiting pipeline-related jobs to residents furthered permissible interests by ensuring that
extraction of the state's natural resources would occur in a manner most beneficial to its citizens,
565 P.2d at 168-69, and that the indicia of residence relied upon were not unreasonable, id at 170-
71. The durational residency requirement had failed to satisfy this test because its impact was
imprecise.
116. 443 F. Supp. 228 (D. Hawaii 1977). See notes 11-12 and accompanying text supra.
117. Id at 239 n.24.
118. Subsequently, the Hawaii Senate Committee on Human Resources report on a bill
that was to become act 101 stated:
A recently completed study by the State Administration indicates that approximately
10% of those hired for jobs in State government during fiscal year 1976-77 were either
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jobs that act 211 might have protected, Judge King concluded that even
if this asserted objective were permissible, no rational relationship be-
tween it and the challenged legislation had been established.119
The second objective not yet examined by the United States
Supreme Court is that of safeguarding a state's natural and cultural
resources and environment from the destructive consequences of exces-
sive population growth. As Governor Ariyoshi emphasized in his State-
of-the-State Address:
Too many people means too few jobs and too much competi-
tion for them; too many people means too little land for agriculture
and parks and scenic vistas; too many people means too much crime
and too much erosion of possibly our single most important com-
modity, the Aloha Spirit; too many people means too much pressure
on all our governmental and private institutions.
In short, too many people can spell disaster for this State.
Hawaii is a national treasure, but it is a very fragile treasure,
one which can be easily destroyed by over-population and excessive
demands on its resources.' 20
With regard to the objective of protecting Hawaii's natural and cultural
resources, it should be noted at the outset that this objective was not
mentioned in the conference committee report on act 211.121 Nor was
the state able to offer in Nehring v. Ari',oshi 22 any evidence indicating
the number of prospective immigrants who might be deterred from
coming to Hawaii by act 211.'23 In the absence of such evidence, Judge
King could find no rational basis for the legislation in terms of environ-
mental protection. 24 Moreover, if act 211 or any other durational resi-
dency requirement is to be defended by reference to the objective of
preservation, it is probably crucial that the requirement be part of a
comprehensive scheme to preserve Hawaii's natural and cultural re-
sources and that this scheme should also call for sacrifices on the part
of the current residents. Adoption of a comprehensive growth-limita-
tion-and-management program would assist in persuading the federal
nonresidents or residents of less than one year duration at the time of their job applica-
tion. This figure represents more than two and one-half times the incidence of "less than
one-year residents' in the State's employed labor force.
COMMrrTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES REP. ON S.B. No. 1787-78, at 1-2 (Mar. 7, 1978).
119. 443 F. Supp. at 239.
120. State-of-the-State Address by Hon. George R. Ariyoshi, delivered before the Ninth
State Legislature (Jan. 25, 1977).
121. See CONFERENCE COMM. RnP. No. 11 ON S.B. No. 1350, S. Doc. No. 1, H. Doc, No.
2 (April 14, 1977).
122. 443 F. Supp. 228 (D. Hawaii 1977). See notes 11-12 and accompanying text supra.
123. Id at 238-39.
124. Id at 239.
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courts that preservation, and not some other unacceptable objective,
was the motivating factor behind the durational residency requirement;
such a scheme would also help to demonstrate that alternative methods
of preservation that would be less disruptive of interstate travel had
already been utilized.' 25
If Hawaii were to confront an environmental or resource crisis
comparable to a wartime situation, the United States Supreme Court
might be willing to countenance even draconian and highly discrimina-
tory measures affecting choice of residence, if the state believed such
measures would help to relieve the crisis. In the absence of such an
environmental or resource crisis, however, it is not clear whether the
objective of preservation would be viewed by the Court as a sufficient
justification for a durational residency requirement that interfered with
or penalized interstate travel. The state's argument would be particu-
larly susceptible to challenge if freeways and single-family subdivisions
continued to be built while the state is claiming that it has reached the
crisis point in its growth.
4. New Constitutional Tests
Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court indicate
that it may be favorably disposed to local efforts to curb population
growth. Perhaps the clearest indication in this regard appeared in the
1974 decision of Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,126 which held that a
residential community's restriction of its houses to "families" was con-
stitutional.1 27 In an opinion written by Justice Douglas, the Court rec-
ognized the important aesthetic, cultural and social values that are
preserved and promoted by limitations on population 28 and dismissed
125. See generally Selinger & Schoen, "To Purify the Bar A Constitutional Approach to
Non-Professional Misconduct, 5 NAT. RES. J. 299, 324-25 n.89 (1965).
126. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). See generally Frame & Scorza, Village ofBelle Terre v. Boraas:
Property Rights, Personal Rights and the Liberal Regime, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 935 (1975);
Margolis, Exclusionary Zoning. For Whom Does Belle Terre Toll 11 C L. WEST. L. REv. 85
(1974).
127. The municipal ordinance in question defined the word "family" to mean one or more
persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage, or not more than two unrelated persons, living
and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit and expressly excluding from the term lodg-
ing, boarding, fraternity or multiple-dwelling houses. It was challenged b' six unrelated college
students leasing a house together. See 416 U.S. at 2-4.
128. Indeed, the Court observed:
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are legiti-
mate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family needs. This goal is a permissi-
ble one . :.. The police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench and
unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the
blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.
416 U.S. at 9.
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as unimportant the incidental infringements on the rights of travel and
association imposed by such a zoning ordinance.1 29
Two subsequent decisions in the spring of 1976 recognized
the importance of the implementation of a state's essential functions. In
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,130 the Court held that the State of
Maryland could grant preferential treatment to entrepreneurs residing
within its borders in its efforts to clear the landscape of derelict
automobiles. The state's scheme was to grant bounty payments to per-
sons who hauled away abandoned hulks, but receiving the bounty was
made considerably easier if they brought these hulks to junk dealers in
Maryland rather than to out-of-state dealers.' 31 The Alexandria Scrap
Corporation contended that this scheme discriminated against busi-
nesses in other states and therefore violated the commerce clause of the
United States Constitution. The Court rejected this argument and thus
permitted the state to prefer its own residents to those of other states.' 32
129. Id. at 7-8. Cf. Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 906-09
(9th Cir. 1975). The Ninth Circuit cited Belle Terre in order to sustain a municipal zoning scheme
that severely limited development, indicating that if the challenged system of delegated zoning
was considered objectionable, that complaint should be addressed to the legislature. But f Ras-
mussen v. City of Lake Forest, 404 F. Supp. 148, 151 (N.D. Ill. 1975). That case involved a chal-
lenge to a local law prohibiting sales of lots of less than 1-1/2 acres. The district court
distinguished Belle Terre, indicating that that decision had been preceded by hearings as to the
purpose and effect of the questioned ordinance and Construction Industry Ass'n pointing out that
Lake Forest, unlike Petaluma, had not announced a comprehensive development scheme.
More recently, however, the Court has distinguished Belle Terre. In Moore v. City of E.
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), a challenge was raised against a municipal statute that defined the
term family to include only single housekeeping units consisting of the nominal head of the house-
hold and his or her. (a) spouse, (b) unmarried children or such children of his or her spouse,
provided such children have no progeny residing with them, (c) parents or the parents of his or her
spouse or (d) dependent married or unmarried child, provided there was no more than one of such
children residing in the household. Id at 496 n.2. The plurality opinion of the Court observed that
the law in Belle Terre affected only unrelated individuals, while East Cleveland's ordinance
"slic[ed] deeply into the family itself." Id. at 498. Because of the intrusive nature of this law, a
strict scrutiny level of review was applied and the challenged ordinance could not survive this
degree of analysis. See id. at 499-500.
130. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
131. Before the processor to whom the hulk was delivered could receive a bounty, he had to
submit documentation indicating clear title to the derelict, consisting of a simple certificate, signi-
fying that the person who transferred the vehicle had himself acquired title by following statuto-
rily-prescribed procedures, and an indemnification agreement whereby the wrecker promised to
remunerate the processor for liability to third parties; but a non-Maryland processor had to submit
more complex documentation in order to receive his bounty, including a certificate of title, a
police certificate vesting title and either a bill of sale from a police auction or a wreckers certifi-
cate of title where applicable. See id at 800-01.
132. The Court applied the test of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970), in
which it was stated that "the extent of the burden [on interestate commerce] that will be tolerated
will . . . depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted
as well with a lesser impact on intersiate activities." In Hughes, the Court found no prohibition on
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Similarly, in National League of Cities v. Usery,133 the Court held that
Congress could not impose minimum wage and maximum hour re-
quirements on state governments. 134 It observed that while Congress
can apply such regulations to businesses engaged in interstate com-
merce, which includes virtually every business, the state retains its own
sovereignty, as recognized by the Tenth Amendment; consequently, the
federal government cannot impose its views on the state if that imposi-
tion would interfere with an essential state function.1 35 This precedent
is particularly relevant to Hawaii's new residency requirements for
public employment because the National League of Cities case may be
read as a grant of broad freedom to the states in making decisions re-
garding their own employees without federal interference. Two federal
district courts, however, have recently held National League of Cities
inapplicable to a claim of age discrimination in state employment and
have ruled that Congress can regulate such discrimination by state gov-
ernments as part of its power to implement the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 136 Thus, the expansive approach of Na-
the interstate flow of hulks, only an effort by the state to enter into the market for such commodi-
ties in order to bid up their price. 426 U.S. at 806. Applying the rational basis level of review, the
Court similarly found that the state law was reasonably related to the purpose of ameliorating the
environment; therefore, an equal protection challenge was also rejected. Id at 814.
133. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). See generally Michelman, States'Rights and States'Roles: Permu-
tations of "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165 (1977); Tribe,
Unraveling National League of Cities. The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Gov-
ernment Services, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1977).
134. The definition of "employer" under the Fair Labor Standards Act, which prescribed
such wages and hours, had been amended in 1974 to include the term "public agencies," itself
defined to encompass the government of a state or the subdivisions thereof. 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(d),
203(s)(5), 203(x) (Supp. V 1975).
135. 426 U.S. at 845-46. The Court observed that:
One undoubted attribute of state sovereignty is the States' power to determine the
wages which shall be paid to those whom they employ in order to carry out their govern-
mental functions, what hours those persons will work, and what compensation will be
provided where these employees may be called upon to work overtime. The question we
must resolve here, then, is whether these determinations are "'functions essential to sep-
arate and independent existence,'" . . . so that Congress may not abrogate the States'
otherwise plenary authority to make them.
Id at 845-46 (quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911) (quoting Lane County v.
Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1869)). In light of increased costs, possible curtailment of some
state services and the displacement of state minimum wage restriction policies, interference with
fundamental functions was found. Id. at 846-51.
136. See Remmick v. Barnes County, 435 F. Supp. 914, 916 (D.N.D. 1977); Aaron v. Davis,
424 F. Supp. 1238, 1240-41 (E.D. Ark. 1976). Both these cases involved claims that the Age Dis-
crimination Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), one provision of
which included states or the political subdivisions thereof within the definition of "employer," 29
U.S.C. § 630(b) (1970), could not be applied constitutionally to states. Each court pointed out that
although National League of Cities had invalidated federal regulations of state activities based on
the commerce clause, it had not indicated that federal regulations based on section five of the
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tional League of Cities may not apply to situations in which Congress
has enacted regulatory statutes pursuant to the enabling provisions of
that amendment.
In its very first opinion of the October 1977 term, the
Supreme Court again upheld local regulations over the environment,
even when the regulations discriminated against out-of-state residents.
The Court's decision in County Board of Arlington County v.
Richards137 strongly supports the position that a state may take steps to
protect its environment and safeguard its quality of life notwithstand-
ing the inconveniences that these steps may impose on persons coming
into the state. In Richards, Arlington County had limited parking in a
residential area near a large commercial and office complex to re-
sidents of the area, and this limitation was challenged as a denial of
equal protection to commuters. The Virginia Supreme Court struck
down the ordinance on the ground that it discriminated unconstitution-
ally against residents of Maryland, the District of Columbia and other
parts of Virginia, and thus interfered with the right to travel.138 The
United States Supreme Court, however, unanimously reversed and re-
instated the Arlington ordinance. The Court's brief opinion includes
the following important language:
To reduce air pollution and other environmental effects of au-
tomobile commuting, a community reasonably may restrict on-street
parking available to commuters, thus encouraging reliance on car
pools and mass transit. The same goal is served by assuring conve-
Fourteenth Amendment would be similarly invalid. Indeed, the Court in National League of
Cities had declined expressly to rule on this point, 426 U.S. at 852 n.17, and, in a later decision,
had held that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar a backpay suit against a state based on Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act, Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 453-54 & n.9 (1976). In light of
these factors, many lower federal courts have refused to apply the limitations expressed in Na-
tional League of Cities to federal regulatory legislation based on the Fourteenth Amendment. See,
ag., Stiner v. Califano, 438 F. Supp. 796, 800 n.4 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (suit seeking injunction
against federal regulation requiring certain staffing ratios in day care centers receiving social se-
curity disbursements); Curran v. Portland Superior School Comm., 435 F. Supp. 1063, 1077 n.7
(D. Maine 1977) (sex-based discrimination claim based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1970 & Supp V 1975)); State of Colorado v. Veterans' Administration,
430 F. Supp. 551, 559 (D. Colo. 1977) (suit seeking reimbursement of overpayments made by the
Veterans' Administration to state educational institutions); Usery v. Edward J. Meyer Memorial
Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 1368, 1375 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) (suit based on equal pay provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(d)(x), 206(a)(1), 207 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)); Brown v.
County of Santa Barbara, 427 F. Supp. 112, 113-14 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (same); Usery v. Owensboro-
Daviess County Hosp., 423 F. Supp. 843, 846 (W.D. Ky. 1976) (same); Usery v. Dallas Independ-
ent School Dist., 421 F. Supp. 111, 114-16 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (sex discrimination claim based on
Title VII).
137. 98 S. Ct. 24 (1977).
138. County Bd. of Arlington County v. Richards, 217 Va. 645, 651, 231 S.E.2d 231, 235
(1977).
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nient parking to residents who leave their cars at home during the
day. A community may also decide that restrictions on the flow of
outside traffic into particular residential areas would enhance the
quality of life thereby reducing noise, traffic hazards, and litter. By
definition, discrimination against nonresidents would inhere in such
restrictions.
The Constitution does not outlaw these social and environmen-
tal objectives, nor does it presume distinction between residents and
nonresidents of a local neighborhood to be invidious. The Equal Pro-
tection Clause requires only that the distinction drawn by an ordi-
nance like Arlington's rationally promote the regulation's
objectives. 139
These four recent Supreme Court cases thus indicate that a state
can attempt to define areas of essential state concern and pass legisla-
tion to protect those concerns. A comprehensive statewide approach
would be essential to withstand a constitutional challenge, but the
Court has nevertheless indicated that it may be open to legislation that
would have the effect of limiting growth.
II. Legal Issues Related to "Assumption-of-Residency"
Requirements
Another population control device, which could conceivably es-
cape the constitutional objections to durational residency prerequisites
would be the imposition of "actual" residency or "assumption-of-resi-
dency" requirements. "Durational" residency requirements stipulate
that a person live within the jurisdiction for a fixed period of time. In
contrast, an "actual" residency requirement demands that the person
be currently living within the jurisdiction when he or she works for the
local government or receives governmental benefits. These require-
ments have been passed by the councils of cities that want their munici-
pal employees to live within the city limits, and the United States
Supreme Court has ruled that they are constitutional.140
"Assumption-of-residency" requirements would mandate that an
applicant be a bona fide resident of the jurisdiction before applying for
139. 98 S. Ct. at 26 (footnotes omitted).
140. See McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645 (1976). The ordi-
nance challenged in that case required that all city employees also be city residents. After noting
that prior cases had indicated that prerequisites of continuing residency might be permissible, see
Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 255 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,
342 n.13 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 636 (1969), the Court simply labelled the
Philadelphia continuing residency requirement as bona fide. 424 U.S. at 647. Accord, Andre v.
Board of Trustees, 561 F.2d 48, 53 (7th Cir. 1977); Mogle v. Sevier County School Dist., 540 F.2d
478, 483 (10th Cir. 1976); Cook County College Teachers' Union, Local 1600 v. Taylor, 432 F.
Supp. 270, 272 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Miller v. Krawczyk, 414 F. Supp. 998, 1001 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
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a government job or license. Such a requirement would serve to deter
in-migration by persons who were unable or unwilling to pay the costs
of moving to Hawaii without any prior assurance of being employed
when they arrived. In 1978, the Hawaii legislature enacted act 101, im-
posing an "assumption-of-residency" requirement for governmental
positions formerly covered by act 211.141
A. The Constitutionality of "Assumption-of-Residency" Requirements
The constitutionality of "actual" residency requirements has been
sustained by the courts in a number of situations. Thus, it has been held
that a state need not provide welfare benefits to persons who are non-
residents.' 42 Similarly, a state may prevent a person from voting untir
that individual has been in the state for fifty days in order to serve the
state's important interest in accurate voter lists. 143 In the same fashion,
persons who wish to be admitted to a state bar may be required to be
actual residents of the state for a sufficiently lengthy time before admis-
sion to permit the bar authorities to interview them and otherwise more
effectively investigate their qualifications. 1" Furthermore, a munici-
pality may require that its employees be actual residents rather than
commuters, 145 and a state may demand that a person who wishes to
engage in the practice of law within its borders maintain a permanent
residence there rather than in a neighboring state. 146
With regard to the use of "actual" residency requirements to con-
trol population growth in Hawaii, however, the situations that have
been considered by the courts would appear to be neither significant
nor especially relevant. Hawaii does not have a commuter problem,
and persons from other states who have been offered employment in
Hawaii would generally be quite willing to maintain actual residences
in Hawaii during the course of their employment. Hence, for a resi-
dency requirement to be an effective population control device, it
would have to stipulate, as act 101 does, that a person must already
141. See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
142. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 636 (1969).
143. Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 681 (1973). Accord, Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686,
687 (1973).
144. See Lipman v. Van Zant, 329 F. Supp. 391, 401-04 (N.D. Miss. 1971) (ninety-day
period sustained); Webster v. Wofford, 321 F. Supp. 1259, 1262 (N.D. Ga. 1970) (residency re-
quirement must be "reasonable," not "onerous") (dictum).
145. McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645 (1976). For other cases in
agreement, see note 140 supra.
146. Aronson v. Ambrose, 366 F. Supp..37, 43-44 (D.V.I. 1972); Brown v. Supreme Court
of Va., 359 F. Supp. 549, 557-58 (E.D. Va. 1973).
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have assumed residency in Hawaii before his or her application could
be considered. Such an "assumption-of-residency" requirement is,
however, subject to three possible constitutional objections: the same
equal protection-interference with interstate travel objection that has
been leveled against durational residency requirements; the objection
that an "assumption-of-residency" requirement burdens interstate
commerce in violation of article one, section eight, clause three of the
federal Constitution;1 47 and the objection that such a requirement in-
fringes the privileges and immunities of citizens guaranteed by article
four, section two of the federal Constitution.1
48
The United States Supreme Court's opinion in McCarthy v. Phila-
deiphia Civil Service Commission149 does suggest that the Court would
find that an "assumption-of-residency" requirement did not interfere
with or penalize interstate travel.
We have not .. .specifically addressed the contention made
by appellant in this case that his constitutionally recognized right to
travel interstate as defined in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); and Memorial Hospi-
tal v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974), is impaired. Each of
those cases involved a statutory requirement of residence in the State
for at least one year before becoming eligible either to vote, as in
Dunn, or to receive welfare benefits, as in Shapiro and Memorial
Hospital. Neither in those cases, nor in any others, have we question-
ed the validity of a condition placed upon municipal employment
that a person be a resident at the time of his application.' 5
0
It can also be argued that if interferences with interstate travel arising
from the denial of public employment and the franchise are to be
treated as comparable restrictions, then the constitutionality of "as-
sumption-of-residency" requirements for public employment follows
logically from the Court's decision in Dunn v. Blumstein,'5 ' which up-
held such requirements for voting. Language in McCarthy also indi-
cates, however, that the Court intended to uphold only continuing
residency requirements while a person was employed by a particular
municipality. Therefore, "assumption-of-residency" requirements
147. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 vests exclusively in Congress the power to "regulate
Commerce with Foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with Indian Tribes... "
148. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 stipulates that "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to
all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."
149. 424 U.S. 645 (1976). See note 140 and accompanying text supra.
150. Id. at 646 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
151. 405 U.S. 330 (1972). See note 28 supra.
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might still be subject to strict scrutiny-especially in light of the excep-
tional costs involved in moving from the mainland to Hawaii.
In this case appellant claims a constitutional right to be employed by
the city of Philadelphia while he is living elsewhere. There is no sup-
port in our cases for such a claim.
We have previously differentiated between a requirement of
continuing residency and a requirement of prior residency of a given
duration. Thus in Shapiro, ... we stated: "The residence require-
ment and the one-year waiting-period requirement are distinct and
independent prerequisites." And in Memorial Hospital, ... the
Court explained that Shapiro and Dunn did not question" 'the valid-
ity of appropriately defined and uniformly applied bona fide resi-
dence requirements."'
This case involves that kind of bona fide continuing residence
requirement.152
In contrast, the Alaska Supreme Court in Hicklin v. Orbeck,153
which upheld an "assumption-of-residency" requirement for public
employment, read McCarthy as standing for the proposition that "[a]
residency requirement does not penalize the right of interstate migra-
tion, unlike a durational residency requirement, because it does not
burden those who have recently migrated interstate. Hence it is not
subject to strict scrutiny on that ground." 154
The Alaska court also concluded that an "Alaska Hire" law for
jobs under state contracts for extracting or transporting oil and gas did
not contravene the privileges and immunities clause. Early in the na-
tion's history, Justice Bushrod Washington, in the case of Coi77eld v.
Coryell,155 had observed that the privileges and immunities protected
by that clause included "[t]he right of a citizen of one state to pass
through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agricul-
ture, professional pursuits, or otherwise." 156 Relying, however, on the
actual facts of the Corfeld case and on those underlying the United
States Supreme Court's 1877 decision in McCready v. Virginia,157 both
of which involved the rights of non-residents to gather shellfish in state
waters, the three-justice majority on the Alaska court held that "Alaska
152. 424 U.S. at 646-47 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County,
415 U.S. 250, 255 (1974) (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 n.13 (1972)); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 636 (1969)).
153. 565 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1977), rev'd in part, 46 U.S.L.W. 4773 (U.S. June 22, 1978). See
notes 49-51, 106-07 and accompanying text supra.
154. 565 P.2d at 166 (citing McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645,
646-47 (1976); Lynden Transport, Inc. v. State, 532 P.2d 700, 706-07 (Alaska 1975)).
155. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
156. Id at 552.
157. 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 391 (1877).
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Hire [is] an economic measure justified by the 'natural resources excep-
tion,' the principle that a state may prefer its residents in dealing with
natural resources it owns."158 Interestingly, the majority did not rest its
decision on a related claim, which was set forth in Conference Commit-
tee Report 11 on Hawaii's act 211, that public employment is itself a
state resource that can be restricted to persons who have already as-
sumed residence within the state.'5 9
The two dissenting justices in the Hicklin case argued that the
later decision of the United States Supreme Court in Toomer v.
Witsell,160 which refused to apply the "natural resources exception" to
free swimming shellfish in coastal, as distinguished from inland, wa-
ters, had "[cast] serious doubt on the continued authority of
McCready."1 61 They quoted the following language from Toomer:
The whole ownership theory, in fact, is now generally regarded
as but a fiction expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its
people that a State have power to preserve and regulate the exploita-
tion of an important resource. And there is no necessary conflict be-
tween that vital policy consideration and the constitutional command
that the State exercise that power, like its other powers, so as not to
discriminate without reason against citizens of other States.
These considerations lead us to the conclusion that the
McCready exception to the privileges and immunities clause, if such
it be, should not be expanded to cover this case.162
This assertion may require some modification in light of the United
States Supreme Court's recent decision in Baldwin v. Fish & Game
158. 565 P.2d at 169.
159. SeeCONFERENCE COMM. REP. No. 11 ON S.B. No. 1350, S. Doc. No. 1, H. Doc. No.
2 (April 14, 1977). The Hawaii Senate Committee on Human Resources Report on the bill that
was to become act 101 sought to justify the proposed statute's public employment preferences for
residents who have previously filed state income tax returns on the ground that it would assure
taxpayers of "rightful consideration for job opportunities which tax dollars create.' CoMMrrrEE
ON HUMAN RESOURCES REP. ON S.B.No. 1787-78, at 2 (Mar. 7, 1978).
160. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
161. 565 P.2d at 172 (Boochever, CJ., dissenting in part, joined by Rabinowitz, J.).
162. 334 U.S. at 402 (footnote omitted) quotedin 565 P.2d at 172 (Boochever, C.J., dissent-
ing in part, joined by Rabinowitz, J.). The Court in Toomer was also able to distinguish
McCready on its facts. The latter case sustained a Virginia law prohibiting citizens from planting
oysters in the tidal waters of the Ware River, the Court therein called the right to engage in such
planting "a property right, and not a mere privilege or immunity of citizenship." McCready v.
Virginia, 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 391, 395 (1877). The primary law challenged in Toomer, however, was
one imposing a tax on nonresident shrimp fishermen in South Carolina's three-mile maritime belt
that was one hundred times greater than the amount exacted from resident fishermen. 334 U.S. at
389. The Court thus distinguished McCready by observing: (1) that that case dealt with fish that
would remain in Virginia until removed by man, whereas the instant case dealt with free-swim-
ming fish that are only temporarily in the coastal waters of any state and (2) that McCready
concerned fishing in inland waters, while South Carolina sought to regulate shrimping in its mar-
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Commission of Montana.163 In that case, the Court reaffirmed the "nat-
ural resource exception," holding that a statute imposing discrimina-
tory license fees on nonresident elk-hunters did not violate the
privileges and immunities clause; but, in doing so, it observed that the
Montana statute affected only the recreational interests of nonresidents
and not their ability to earn a livelihood, as had been the case in
Toomer.164 Moreover, the dissenters in the Hicklin case argued 165 that
an extension of the "natural resources exception" from restrictions on
the disposition of state resources themselves to restrictions on employ-
ginal sea. Id at 401-02. These factors also led the Court in Toomer to conclude that the South
Carolina law unduly burdened interstate commerce. Id at 403-06. See also Douglas v. Seacoast
Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 281-82 (1977).
In a similar fashion, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has also held that the
state legislature's prohibition on coastal fishing by non-residents violated the privileges and im-
munities clause of the Constitution; in so doing, it observed that the "Mc Cready case, if it retains
any vitality, seems now to be restricted to shellfish or to tidewaters." Commonwealth v. Westcott,
- Mass.-,-, 344 N.E.2d 411,413 (1976), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 431 U.S. 322
(1977).
163. 98 S. Ct. 1852 (1978).
164. Baldwin involved a challenge to a Montana licensing scheme for elk-hunters that im-
posed license fees on non-residents which were 7 1/2 times greater than those exacted from re-
sidents. In discussing the privileges and immunities clause, the Court noted that state citizenship
or residency could legitimately be used to restrict exercise of the franchise or access to public
employment; it concluded that "[o]nly with respect to those 'privileges' and 'immunities' bearing
upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity must the State treat all citizens, resident and non-
resident, equally." Id. at 1860. After mentioning the Geer, McCready and Cofield cases and the
natural resources exception that they created, the Court observed:
Appellants contend that the doctrine on which Co(7leld and McCready. ... all re-
lied has no remaining vitality. We do not agree. Only last term, in referring to the "own-
ership" or title language of those cases and characterizing it "as no more than a 19th-
century legal fiction," the Court pointed out that that language nevertheless expressed
"'the importance to its people that a state have power to preserve and regulate the ex-
ploitation of an important resource."'. ... The fact that the State's control over wild-
life is not exclusive and absolute in the face of federal regulation and certain federally
protected interests does not compel the conclusion that it is meaningless in their absence.
d at 1861 (quoting Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 284 (1977) (quoting Toomer v.
Witsell, 334 U.S. 385,402 (1948)). Consequently, the Court ruled that the "[a]ppellants' interest
in sharing this limited resource on more equal terms with Montana residents simply does not fall
within the purview of the Privileges and Immunities Clause." Id at 1862. The Court went on to
distinguish the class of cases represented by Toomer, stating:
Appellants do not--and cannot--contend that they are deprived of a means of a liveli-
hood by the system [of licensing] or of access to any part of the State to which they may
seek to travel. We do not decide the full range of activities that are sufficiently basic to
the livelihood of the Nation that the States may not interfere with a non-resident's par-
ticipation therein without similarly interfering with a resident's participation. Whatever
rights or activities may be "fundamental" under the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
we are persuaded, and hold, that elk-hunting by non-residents in Montana is not one of
them.
Id In light of this assertion, it may be argued that Baldwin does not impair the rationale expressed
by the dissenters in Hicklin because that latter case involved a restriction on the right to seek
employment, an activity presumably more fundamental than elk-hunting.
165. 565 P.2d at 173-74 (Boochever, C.J., dissenting in part, joined by Rabinowitz, J.).
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ment would be inconsistent with the basic philosophy regarding the
privileges and immunities clause set forth in Toomer:
The primary purpose of this clause, like the clauses between
which it is located-those relating to full faith and credit and to in-
terstate extradition of fugitives from justice-was to help fuse into
one Nation a collection of independent, sovereign States. It was
designed to insure to a citizen of State A who ventures into State B
the same privileges which the citizens of State B enjoy. For protec-
tion of such equality the citizen of State A was not to be restricted to
the uncertain remedies afforded by diplomatic processes and official
retaliation. "Indeed, without some provision of the kind removing
from the citizens of each State the disabilities of alienage in the other
States, and giving them equality of privilege with citizens of those
States, the Republic would have constituted little more than a league
of States; it would not have constituted the Union which now exists."
In line with this underlying purpose, it was long ago decided
that one of the privileges which the clause guarantees to citizens of
State A is that of doing business in State B on terms of substantial
equality with the citizens of that State.166
With respect to the burden on interstate commerce, the second
possible constitutional objection to "assumption-of-residency" require-
ments, the Alaska court observed that although "no commerce clause
claim is advanced against Alaska Hire," 167 the United States Supreme
Court's commerce clause decision in Edwards v. Caif/orniaI68 would
not apply to the Alaska requirement:
In Edwards, the Court held invalid a state law making it a crime to
assist indigent non-residents to come into the state. In purpose and in
effect, the law was a direct barrier to interstate travel and migration.
Alaska Hire does not erect a barrier to interstate travel or migration.
With the durational residence requirement stricken, it permits new as
well as long-time residents to receive a preference. It gives the state's
benefits to those who bear its burdens, without placing any limitation
on who inay voluntarily assume those benefits and burdens. 169
As to the effects of "assumption-of-residency" requirements, this rea-
soning is not altogether convincing. If such requirements were to be
adopted for the purpose of controlling a state's population, they would
166. 334 U.S. at 395-96 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168,
180 (1868)).
167. 565 P.2d at 169.
168. 314 U.S. 160 (1941). In Edwards, the Court invalidated a law making it a crime to
assist indigent non-residents to come into the state. A majority of five held that the law constituted
a trade barrier in violation of the commerce clause. Id at 173-74. Four concurring justices also
argued that the statute infringed the right to interstate travel, one of the privileges and immunities
conferred by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id at 177-79 (Douglas, J., concurring, joined by Black
& Murphy, JJ.); id. at 183 (Jackson, J., concurring).
169. 565 P.2d at 169.
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seem to controvert the philosophy of the commerce clause expressed by
the Supreme Court in the Edwards case:
We have repeatedly and recently affirmed, and we now reaffirm, that
we do not conceive it our function to pass upon "the wisdom, need,
or appropriateness" of the legislative efforts of the States to solve
such difficulties.
But this does not mean that there are no boundaries to the per-
missible area of State legislative activity. There are. And none is
more certain than the prohibition against attempts on the part of any
single State to isolate itself from difficulties common to all of them
by restraining the transportationi of persons and property across its
borders. It is frequently the case that a State might gain a momentary
respite from the pressure of events by the simple expedient of shut-
ting its gates to the outside world. But, in the words of Mr. Justice
Cardozo: "The Constitution was framed under the dominion of a
political philosophy less parochial in range. It was framed upon the
theory that the peoples of the several States must sink or swim to-
gether, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union
and not division." 170
It is at least conceivable, however, that the Burger Court might find
greater merit in a state's isolationist tactics where such tactics are em-
ployed for the purpose of preserving its natural and cultural resources
than for the purpose of protecting its economic position. A key basis for
such a distinction might be the potentially irreversible character of
damage to the environment from excessive population growth, as con-
trasted with the usually cyclical and at least partially remediable char-
acter of economic depressions.
B. The Forms of "Assumption-of-Residency" Requirements
The "assumption-of-residency" requirement of Hawaii's act 101
defines "residency" as physical presence within the state at the time of
establishing domicile, with an intention to reside in Hawaii perma-
nently; the act further specifies that in determining intent, the mainte-
nance of a permanent place of residence in Hawaii and the absence of
one in another state shall be considered. 71 Presuming that "assump-
tion-of-residency" requirements for public employment are constitu-
tional, it would appear that the state has considerable discretion in
determining the severity of such prerequisites. Given Hawaii's location,
even a simple requirement that a person be physically present in the
state would serve to deter in-migration by persons who could or would
not spend the transportation costs to Hawaii without some previous as-
170. 314 U.S. at 173-74 (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 512 (1935)).
171. 1978 Haw. Sess. Laws, act 101. See note 13 supra.
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surance of employment. In Hicklin, the Alaska Supreme Court sus-
tained the applicability to public employment of a thirty-day waiting
period, which was otherwise required to verify residence within the
state for the purpose of voting. 172 Hawaii could in fact probably impose
the maintenance of a place of residence within its borders as a require-
ment rather than treat it as one of several factors to be considered. The
Alaska court decision also upheld such a prerequisite, after construing
it to mean "being ordinarily physically present in Alaska, having a
place within Alaska where one ordinarily stays, and having no such
place elsewhere."' 73 Such a requirement, which would mandate that a
person actually move to Hawaii before applying for employment, is
currently imposed as a prerequisite for any exercise of the franchise in
Hawaii.174
Finally, the Alaska court also sustained the further requirement,
similar to that of act 101, that a person applying for employment show
"by all attending circumstances" that his intent is to make Alaska his
permanent residence. 175 Relying on the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Vlandis v. Kline,176 which indicated that a "domicile" test
constituted a "reasonable standard for determining the residential sta-
tus of a student"'' 77 for tuition purposes, the state court equated perma-
nent residency with domicile-although it acknowledged:
"'Permanent' does not require a promise to stay here forever."178 To
satisfy the subjective intent requirement, a person may be required to
show that he or she does not claim residency in another state at the
time of application or receive benefits from another state by virtue of
his or her residency there. 179 Indications that a person has an "intent to
remain and not to go elsewhere" may include paying taxes and register-
ing an automobile; indications to the contrary may include physical
presence outside the state in the last two years and voting outside the
172. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 565 P.2d 159, 171 (Alaska 1977). See also State v. Van Dort, 502
P.2d 453, 454-55 (Alaska 1972) (held thirty-day residency requirement for voters was the maxi-
mum permissible duration).
173. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 565 P.2d 159, 170 (Alaska 1977).
174. See HAW. REv. STAT. tit. 2, §§ 11-13(1), 11-13(4) (1976). Subsection one indicates that
a place of residency is that place in which habitation is fixed and to which one who is absent
intends to return; subsection four states that the mere intention to acquire a new residence without
physical presence there will not establish residency.
175. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 565 P.2d 159, 169 (Alaska 1977).
176. 412 U.S. 441 (1973). See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
177. Id at 454.
178. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 565 P.2d 159, 170 (Alaska 1977).
179. Id at 169-70.
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HI. Legal Issues Related to Housing and Land Use
Land ownership in Hawaii is highly concentrated, resembling al-
most a feudalistic pattern. 18' Most land use decisions are thus made by
only a few private corporations 182 and the public's input is generally
minimal. Only small amounts of land are available for purchase and a
smaller percent of the population own their own homes than in any
other state. 8 3 As a result, large private landowners are currently mak-
ing decisions that may irreversibly affect the state's future. Because of
Hawaii's corporation laws, corporate directors managing large amounts
of private capital or landholdings will make decisions ensuring the
maximization of their profits. 84 Such a decisional calculus will gener-
ally lead corporations in Hawaii to substitute resort and residential de-
180. Id at 170-71.
181. Under ancient Hawaiian custom, property was divided into ahupuaas, strips of land
running from the sea to the mountains, thus enabling individual chieftans to utilize all the natural
resources of the islands. Palama v. Sheehan, 50 Haw. 298, 300, 440 P.2d 95, 97 (1968). These
ahufpuaas were often subdivided into ills, of which there were two varieties: the Ili of the Ahupuaa,
a mere division of the latter for the convenience of the chief holding the ahupuaa and the Ii
Kupono, subdivisions independent of the ahupuaa, which were managed by landlords (Konohiki)
who paid tribute not to the chieftan of the ahupuaa, but to the king himself. See Territory v. Gay,
31 Haw. 376, 380-81 (1930); Harris v. Carter, 6 Haw. 195, 206-07 (1877). In 1846, an act was
passed establishing a Board of Land Commissioners to Quiet Titles, Law of April 27, 1846, pt. I,
ch. VII, art. IV, §§ 1-13 [1846] I Statute Laws of His Majesty Kamehameha III, King of the
Hawaiian Islands, at 107 (repealed 1854). Under this law, arbitration of land disputes was con-
ducted under principles recognizing the ancient land schemes of the Hawaiians. Two years later,
the king and 240 chieftans effected the Great Mahele of 1848, as a result of which two-fifths of the
four million acres of land in the islands was vested with the native chiefs, 30,000 acres were given
to commoners and the remainder was vested in the crown. Kemper, The Antitrust Laws and
Land An Answer to Hawaii's Housing Crisis?, 8 HAWAII B.J. 5, 7 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Kemper]. See generally J. CHINEN, THE GREAT MAHELE (1958). Transfer of title was not actu-
ally effected by the Great Mahele itself; a claimant had to petition the Land Commission to award
him property. Distribution was generally accomplished by a grant of parcels bearing the tradi-
tional appellation ahufpuaa or ili. In re Boundaries of Pulehunui, 4 Haw. 239, 240 (1879). Subse-
quently, surveyors demarcating the property awarded would rely on Kamaaina (native born) to
tell them where the ancient ahupuaas or is had existed. In re Application of Ashford, 50 Haw.
314,316,440 P.2d 76,77(1968). See Town & Yuen, PublicAccess to Beaches in Hawaii: 'A Social
Necessity' 10 HAw. BJ. 5, 9-11 (1973). Thus, as the court in Ashford observed, Hawaii's land
laws are unique in that "they are based on ancient tradition, custom, practice, and usage." 50
Haw. at 315, 440 P.2d at 77.
182. As one commentator has observed, the seventy-two largest landowners in the state
own 47% of the property therein. Combining this figure with the percentage of land owned by the
state and federal governments the resultant percentage is 95.5%. Kemper, supra note 181, at 7.
183. See generally id. at 5-7.
184. See HAw. REv. STAT. tit. 23, § 416-18 (Supp. 1977) (requires officers and directors of
corporations to make decisions consistent with corporate bylaws.)
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velopment for agricultural uses. Consequently, other considerations,
such as environmental preservation and conservation and the agricul-
tural and recreational needs of future generations, are subordinated to
the profit motive. Only if the public sector actively intervenes will these
other considerations be weighed. It is thus of vital importance that the
public sector develop a comprehensive land use scheme for the state
and that every possible legal device be used to restrain the unlimited
development that would serve the short-term interests of the large pri-
vate landowners.
A. State Bureaucratic Controls of Land Use: Existing Structure and
Proposed Change
Three major commissions currently affect the development and
utilization of land in the State of Hawaii: (1) the Land Use Commis-
sion, 185 (2) the Executive Board of the Department of Land and Natu-
ral Resources (the Land Board),186 and (3) each county's Planning
Commission. 187 Suggestions to change this structure, however, are be-
ing broached. For example, Lieutenant Governor Nelson Doi has re-
185. See HAw. REV. STAT. tit. 13, § 205-1 (1976). This law created a Land Use Commis-
sion consisting of nine members, one appointed from each county, the rest appointed at large.
None of the commissioners are allowed to hold other public offices. Id. They are appointed by
the governor for four-year terms and may receive no salaries, although they are reimbursed for
actual expenses incurred in the performance of their duties. HAw. REn. STAT. tit. 4, § 26-34
(1976). Pursuant to law, land use districts consist of four types: urban, rural, agricultural and
conservation; it is the task of the Land Use Commission to designate areas by these labels. HAw.
Rnv. STAT. tit. 13, § 205-2 (1976).
186. SeeHAw. REv. STAT. tit. 4, § 26-15 (1976). The Land Board consists of six members,
one appointed from each land district and two appointed at large by the governor pursuant to
HAw. REv. STAT. tit. 4 § 26-34 (1976), see note 185 supra. Its duties are to manage and adminis-
ter the state's public lands and the natural resources located thereon.
187. See HAw. REv. STAT. tit. 6, § 46-5 (1976). A Planning Commission for counties with
populations of less than 100,000 is authorized to (a) formulate a master plan for development, (b)
establish zoning regulations and (c) recommend the establishment of building zones. Members of
such commissions are appointed pursuant to HAw. REv. STAT. tit. 4, § 26-34 (1976).
This structure raises an interesting issue. Because most of the commissioners on either
the Land Use or Planning Commissions or the Land Board receive no salaries and thus earn their
living by working in the private sector while serving only part-time as commissioners, serious
conflicts of interest may develop when such persons cast votes actually or ostensibly favoring their
private employers. Full-time, salaried commissioners (a) might feel more responsibility to the
taxpayers and (b) might develop more expertise in the subject area with which they deal. But
there may be serious drawbacks in having experts decide questions on technical bases at odds with
the public interest. Another alternative would be elected rather than appointive commissioners,
so that incumbents become more accountable to the public for the Commission's overall record,
and opposition candidates with different land-use philosophies have an opportunity to secure
public support for implementation of their views. But here, too, caution is necessary; many per-
sons who could exercise such power wisely may not enjoy campaigning for office. At any rate,
this is one aspect of Hawaiian land planning where change may be helpful.
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cently proposed the Aina Malama Amendment, 88 which would
constitutionalize land use designations and require a public referen-
dum to make any change in classifications. Proposed changes would be
nominated by public petition, by the Land Board, the Land Use Com-
mission or the Federal Department of Parks and Recreation for lands
within its jurisdiction. Public petitions would contain the signatures of
a certain percentage of all registered voters residing in the county in
which the land at issue is located. All petitions would be certified by
the Chief Elections Officer' 89 and would be voted on at the following
general election or at a special election when the Chief Elections Of-
ficer is in receipt of twenty-five qualifying nominations. Approval
would be required by a majority of the voters. An Aina Malama Com-
mission would have the power to exercise final approval over any activ-
ity to be permitted on Aina Malama Lands. The United States
Supreme Court indicated in City of Eastlake v. Forest. City
Enterprises'90 that such public referenda prior to any change in land
use or classification are constitutionally permissible. The majority
opinion in that case argued that such referenda are constitutional be-
cause the people retain the sovereign right to govern themselves and
can exercise that self-governance through any number of permissible
forms.' 91 The dissenters contended, however, that submitting specific
land decisions to popular referenda might deny the affected parties
their right to procedural due process.' 92 The voters might decide errati-
cally or might not have the expertise to decide wisely. Minority inter-
ests might be ignored. The majority of the Court responded to this
contention by observing that such problems can occur under any deci-
sion-making procedure and that the Constitution does not prohibit
It should also be noted that the larger counties have developed complex planning agen-
cies of their own. See CHARTER OF THE COUNTY OF HAWAII, HAw.,§§ 5-4.1 to 5-4.4 (1969);
CHARTER OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, HAW., §§ 5-401 to 5-413 (1973); CHARTER
OF THE COUNTY OF KAUAI, HAw., §§ 15.01 to 15.12 (1969); CHARTER OF THE COUNTY OF MAUI,
HAw., §§ 8-8.1 to 8-8.5 (1977). For a description of the Honolulu planning experience, see Note,
Comprehensive Planning.- Only As Certain As Your Survival, 8 HAw. B.J. 15 (1971).
188. For the text of the Amendment, see OFFICE OF THE LT. GOVERNOR, CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTION OF HAWAII'S LAND: WHY, WHEREFORE AND How?, App. A (1977).
189. See HAw. REv. CODE tit. 2, § 11-2 (1976). The Chief Elections Officer is the state's
Lieutenant Governor, who is entrusted with the supervision of all elections.
190. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
191. See id at 672-74. The Court also rejected a due process challenge, stating that if a
zoning restriction approved by the voters was deemed unreasonable by some, they could challenge
it in state court; the federal Constitution was said to require no more. Id. at 677.
192. See id at 680 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 686-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by
Brennan, .).
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popular democracy.193 Under this recent decision, the Lieutenant Gov-
ernor's proposal would clearly be upheld. Thus, under either the ex-
isting bureaucratic regime or under the proposed referendum system,
the citizens of the state retain the sovereign power to regulate land de-
velopment. The question then remains: what technique of regulation is
permissible?
B. Legal Implications of Selected Techniques
Attempting to avoid urban sprawl and overdevelopment, the State
of Hawaii in 1961 enacted the first statewide land use law in the na-
tion.194 This law was designed to insure that urban growth occurred in
designated areas and not in a haphazard manner as had been the prior
experience. By the very nature of its existence, it also served as an addi-
tional obstacle that potential developers were forced to overcome and,
theoretically, should have slowed development down to a manageable
rate. This goal has not, however, been achieved. In other states, differ-
ent planned development techniques have been tried, with mixed re-
sults. What follows are some examples of these different techniques
and a discussion of how each scheme has fared in the courts. Existing
controls in Hawaii that resemble each alternative are mentioned for
comparison. When applicable on the county level, Honolulu's land reg-
ulation methods will also be used as examples.
L Techniques Utilized by Other Communities
a. Timed Development: Ramapo, New York
In New York, the town of Ramapo adopted a comprehensive zon-
ing ordinance in which the development of residential units was condi-
tioned upon obtaining a special permit to be issued only on the
accumulation of a number of development points.1 95 Such points were
based on the availability of five essential services, 9 6 which the land-
owner could either provide himself (and thus obtain early authoriza-
tion of development) or wait until the township acquired the capability
193. See id at 679 & n.13 (majority opinion).
194. See HAW. REv. STAT. tit. 13, §§ 205-1 to 205-37 (1976).
195. For detailed descriptions of the Ramapo plan, see Bosselman, Can The Town of
Ramapo Pass a Law to Bindthe Rights ofthe Whole World?, 1 FLA ST. L. REV. 234, 238-42 (1973);
Note, So You Want to Mfove to the Suburbs: Policy Formulation and the Constitutionality ofAunici-
pal Growth-Restricting Plans, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 803, 834-38 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Policy and ConstitutionalitM.
196. Namely, sewers, drainage, improved public parks or recreational facilities, roads im-
proved with curbs and sidewalks, and firehouses. N.Y. TowN LAW § 261, 263 (McKinney
1971).
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of doing so. In conjunction with the special permit plan, the town of
Ramapo also adopted a capital improvements program that set up an
eighteen-year schedule for construction of all public facilities. Thus, the
subdivision schedule was inherently tied to the eighteen-year capital
improvements program and all landowners were assured of accumulat-
ing sufficient development points within that time span.197
A group of landowners and home builders challenged the
Ramapo plan in a lawsuit. They questioned the validity of the ordi-
nance on the grounds that it was: (a) exclusionary; (b) beyond the scope
of relevant state enabling legislation; and (c) a taking without just com-
pensation.198 The plaintiffs also alleged that the power to control
growth through sequential development limitations had not been dele-
gated to the town and that the plan was unconstitutional as an invasion
of property rights because it inherently destroyed the value and mar-
ketability of the property for residential uise. 199 The New York Court of
Appeals upheld the validity of the ordinance, but apparently not with-
out some uneasiness:
There is, then, something inherently suspect in a scheme which,
apart from its professed purposes, effects a restriction upon the free
mobility of a people until some time in the future when projected
facilities are available to meet increased demands. Although zoning
must include schemes designed to allow municipalities to more effec-
tively contend with the increased demands of evolving and growing
communities, under its guise, townships have been wont to try their
hand at an array of exclusionary devices in the hope of avoiding the
very burden which growth must inevitably bring .... 200
The New York court stated that it would not countenance exclusionary
zoning but found that the sequential development and timed growth
schemes at issue were not exclusionary but were, instead, valid attempts
197. Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 379-80, 285 N.E.2d 291, 301-03,
334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 152-53 (1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972). The initial six-year
period was controlled by a capital budget so structured as to facilitate optimal provision of all the
essential services enumerated; the second and third six-year periods were governed by a subsidiza-
tion plan listing differing priorities for facilities.
198. 30 N.Y.2d at 363-64, 285 N.E.2d at 296-99, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 142-47. The appellate
division had accepted the plaintiffs' contention that the Ramapo plan was unconstitutionally ex-
clusionary. See Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 37 App. Div. 2d 236, 248, 324 N.Y.S.2d 178,
186 (2d Dep't 1971).
199. Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 366, 285 N.E.2d 291, 294, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138, 142 (1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
200. 30 N.Y.2d at 375, 285 N.E.2d at 200,334 N.Y.S.2d at 154. See Marcus Assoc., Inc. v.
Town of Huntington, 57 App. Div. 2d 116, 119-21, 393 N.Y.S.2d 727, 729-30 (2d Dep't 1977)
(sustained a zoning ordinance limiting the number of uses and occupants and setting a minimum
floor area for each separate use; judicial self-restraint doctrine of Golden relied upon).
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to supplement a community's goal of efficient utilization of land.20
b. Residential Development Control Systems: Petaluma, California
One of the most controversial of the new growth control ordi-
nances has been adopted by Petaluma, California, a community that
experienced rapid growth in the 1960's. Petaluma first imposed a tem-
porary building moratorium in 1971; in August of 1972, it unveiled the
new Residential Development Control System.20 2 Under this scheme, a
maximum of five hundred dwelling units could be built in any one year
between 1972 and 1977; half of those units had to be single-family
dwellings, while the other half had to be multiple-family dwellings.20 3
In addition, three hundred of the units had to be built in the older
portion of Petaluma so that only two hundred could be constructed in
the eastern portion of the town, where most of the recent construction
had taken place.2°4 Determination of which developers would be al-
lowed to build was based on an annual competition among builders
who hoped to construct units in Petaluma during the coming year.205
In Construction Industry Association v. City of Petaluma,20 6 the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California
held that the city's growth control plan violated the constitutional right
of persons to travel and settle freely. The court asserted that the numer-
ical regulation of the city's population precluded residents of other ar-
eas or regions from coming into the region and establishing a residence
in Petaluma.2o7 The city defended its plan by arguing that it had three
201. 30 N.Y.2d at 378, 285 N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 152.
202. For a fuller discussion of the Petaluma plan, see Policy and Constitutionality, supra
note 195, at 838-40. See generally Smith, Does Petaluma Lie At the End of the Road From
Ramapo?, 19 VILL. L. REv. 739 (1974).
203. See Petaluma, Cal., Resolution 6113 N.C.S., Establishing a Residential Development
Control System, August 21, 1972; and Petaluma, Cal., Resolution 6126 N.C.S., Modifying the
General Plan By Adding Thereto a Housing Element, September 5, 1972.
204. See Petaluma, Cal., Resolution 6126 N.C.S., Modifying the General Plan by Adding
Thereto a Housing Element, September 5, 1972. Under this scheme, 8-127 , of future residential
units would have to be constructed for low-and moderate-income people.
205. Competition proceeded in three stages. First, the city's residential evaluation board
repudiated or approved proposals for development depending on the extent to which they con-
formed with the community's general and environmental plan. Under the next two stages
(1) thirty points were assigned for sewer mains, drainage channels, fire protection,
streets, and schools. Twenty-five points were required for issuance of a permit. (2)
eighty points were allocated for design excellence, open space and trail links, inclusion of
low cost housing, and necessary public facilities. Fifty points were required in this group.
Policy and Constitutionality, supra note 195, at 839 n.183.
206. 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974), rev'a, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 934 (1976).
207. 375 F. Supp. at 581.
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compelling state interests to justify the restrictions: (1) the inadequacy
of existing sewage facilities; (2) the insufficiency of existing water sup-
plies; and (3) the zoning power that assured Petaluma an inherent right
to control its own rate of growth.20 8
Rejecting all these defenses, the district judge stated that the city
had purposefully limited the quantity of a commodity (water) to justify
a population limitation based on an alleged inadequacy of that com-
modity and, therefore, had failed to offer a compelling state interest in
that regard.20 9 The putative lack of adequate sewage facilities was dis-
missed with the observation that the city could have resorted to less
burdensome alternatives, such as increasing the capacity of its existing
treatment plants.210 With regard to the sanctity of the zoning power, the
court repudiated that argument on the ground that a municipality ca-
pable of supporting a natural population expansion may not limit
growth simply because it does not prefer to grow at the rate that would
occur under prevailing market demands.211
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed
the trial court, holding that the Construction Industry Association and
local landowners did not have standing to assert the right to travel ar-
gument.212 The Ninth Circuit also stated that the plan was not a viola-
tion of substantive due process but was instead a valid exercise of the
police power to protect the public welfare. 213
208. 1d. at 582-83.
209. Id at 583.
210. Id at 582-83. In support of this conclusion, the district court relied on three Penn-
sylvania cases indicating that communities must deal positively with the problems of population
growth rather than refusing to confront social change by announcing exclusionary zoning policies.
See Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, 439 Pa. 466, 474, 268 A.2d 765, 768-69 (1970); Appeal of Girsh,
437 Pa. 237, 244-45, 263 A.2d 395, 398(1970); National Land & Investment Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa.
504, 532, 215 A.2d 597, 612 (1965).
211. 375 F. Supp. at 583-84.
212. 522 F.2d at 904. The Ninth Circuit observed that the plaintiff had no standing to
assert the rights of a group of unknown third parties allegedly excluded from Petaluma. In so
holding, it relied on the ruling in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 509 (1975), for the proposition
that although the plaintiff-builders were adversely affected by the Petaluma ordinance, "their
economic interests are undisputedl outside the zone of interest to be protected by any purported
constitutional right to travel." 522 F.2d at 904. But the court also observed that the plaintiffs
had standing to raise claims that the Petaluma scheme violated their own due process rights and
unduly burdened interstate commerce. Id at 905. See generally Note, Warth v. Seldi" The Sub-
stantial Probabiliy Test, 3 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 485 (1976).
213. 522 F.2d at 908-09. The court remarked:
If the present system of delegated zoning power does not effectively serve the state inter-
est in furthering the general welfare of the region or entire state, it is the state legisla-
ture's and not the federal courts' role to intervene and adjust the system. . . . [The
federal court is not a super zoning board and should not be called on to mark the point
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c. Housing Limits: Boca Raton, Florida
In 1972, residents of Boca Raton, Florida, approved a referendum
setting a housing limit of 40,000 dwelling units.214 This limit had the
effect of placing a ceiling of about 100,000 on the town's population.
Except for single-family structures and duplexes, all housing construc-
tion was halted from November 1972 until March 1974 through a series
of moratoria.215 In the interim, a Moratorium Variance Advisory
Board was established to review all replotting and rezoning in light of
interim densities.216
In Arvida Corp. v. City of Boca Raton,217 the city's plan was chal-
lenged on the grounds that the demand for moderately-priced housing
could be met only through construction of multiple dwelling units and
that low-density zoning to implement the city's requirements would not
only raise the cost of housing but also bore no reasonable relationship
to the city's ability to provide municipal services.21 8 The federal court
abstained from deciding the constitutional issue until the citizens of
Boca Raton had an opportunity to vote on a referendum repealing the
ordinance.219
d. Referenda: Eastlake, Ohio
The Eastlake City Charter required that any changes in existing
land use be made through a city-wide referendum and be approved by
a fifty-five percent margin.220 Forest City Enterprises applied to the
Eastlake Planning Commission for rezoning of its property to permit
multi-family, high-rise development. The application was approved in.
1971 and the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance was amended to in-
clude the rezoning.22l One year later, Forest City Enterprises applied
at which legitimate local interests in promoting the welfare of the community are out-
weighed by legitimate regional interests.
Id at 908. Accorg Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786, 791 nA (3d
Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Steel Hill Development, Inc. v. Town of
Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956, 960-61 (1st Cir. 1972); Sixth Camden Corp. v. Evesham Township, 420
F. Supp. 709, 723 (D.N.J. 1976). A similar policy ofjudicial self-restraint was relied upon by the
Ninth Circuit to dispose of a commerce clause challenge to the Petaluma scheme. 522 F.2d at 909.
214. CITY CHARTER OF BOCA RATON, FLA., § 12.09 (1972).
215. See Boca Raton, Fla., Ord. Nos. 1744, 1745 (Nov. 15, 1972).
216. See Boca Raton, Fla., Ord. No. 1679 (June 27, 1972).
217. 59 F.R.D. 316 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
218. See id. at 318-19.
219. Id at 324.
220. CITY CHARTER OF EASTLAKE, OHIO, art. VIII, § 3 (1971).
221. Forest City Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 187, 324 N.E.2d
740, 742 (1975).
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for parking and yard approval, which is a preliminary step to obtaining
a construction permit; the Planning Commission denied the application
because Forest City did not obtain voter approval of the council's
amendment to the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance.222
The Eastlake referendum requirement was subsequently chal-
lenged on the ground that it violated Forest City's right to due process.
The Ohio Supreme Court held that the referendum requirement en-
sured that "the potentially arbitrary and unreasonable whims of the
voting public" would decide the reasonable use of property.223 As a
result, the charter provision was deemed to constitute an unlawful dele-
gation of legislative power, thereby circumventing the petitioner's right
to due process of law.22 4 The court also noted that no standards were
established to ensure reasonable, rational and unarbitrary considera-
tion of any petitions requiring referendum approval.225
On a writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed
the state court ruling and held that the referendum requirement did not
violate the due process rights of the landowner.2 26 A majority of the
justices reasoned that the power to legislate is not a privilege given to
the citizens by some external authority but instead, is a right retained
by the people which they can reclaim.227 This decision has important
implications because the referendum can be a useful tool in controlling
growth.
2 Comparison to Existing Hawaiian Techniques
Hawaii's Land Use Commission can be analogized to
Ramapo's Planning Board in that both agencies are involved in the
reclassification of land, thus enabling the development of residential
units.228 But the major difference between the two is that while
Ramapo's Planning Board has a fixed set of guidelines to govern the
outcome of requests for special permits, the Land Use Commission has
no such criteria.2 29 In addition, Ramapo's development technique is
222. Id at 187-88, 324 N.E.2d at 742.
223. Id at 195, 324 N.E.2d at 746.
224. Id at 196, 324 N.E.2d at 746.
225. Id
226. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 679 (1976). Seenotes
190-93 and accompanying text supra.
227. Id at 672.
228. For the duties of the Land Use Commission, see note 185 supra.
229. The relevant statute simply advises the Land Use Commission that (1) in establishing
the boundaries of urban, rural, agricultural or conservation districts certain general policies such
as reserving areas for foreseeable urban growth or protecting lands susceptible to intensive cultiva-
tion ought to be followed, (2) certain types of uses are deemed to characterize each type of district
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tied into its eighteen-year capital improvements program, thereby pro-
viding its planning board with a built-in timing device. In contrast, the
Hawaii Land Use Commission is bound by the state's general plan but
that plan has no specifications regarding timed or sequential
development.2 30
Moreover, after complying with state regulations, a developer
in Hawaii must approach the county in which the proposed develop-
ment is to occur in order to determine whether his proposed scheme
conflicts with any county regulations or general plans 2 31 Honolulu
County has permitted all proposed development near existing public
facilities. But when no public facilities exist or the extant facilities are
inadequate, the county has collaborated with the developer to provide
these services on a pro rata basis. In Hawaii Kai, for instance, the de-
veloper, Bishop Estates, absorbed the cost of a sewer system and in
Miliani, the contractor, Castle and Cook, dedicated lands to public use
for the necessary schools. The developers only agreed, however, to as-
sume these costs in return for approval of a district boundary or zoning
change; the general public still financed the expenses of both off-site
facilities, such as highways, and the upkeep of necessary public serv-
ices, such as police and fire stations.
The Comprehensive Zoning Code in each county is also a
tool with which the government regulates growth to some extent.23 2
The counties use this mechanism to control population densities. The
code specifies the subject matter areas over which the zoning power can
be exercised, subject matter areas that will affect the establishment of
multi-family or single-family districts.2 33 This approach is akin to those
utilized in Petaluma and Boca Raton, in that by designating limited
areas where multi-family and single-family dwellings can be con-
structed, the code restricts the amount of people living within the
county's jurisdiction. Code provisions also permit control of the size of
structures, thereby limiting the number of people a dwelling can
and (3) district boundaries are to be drawn after consideration of the relevant county's general
plan. HAw. REV. STAT. tit. 13, § 205-2 (1976). See also id § 205-16.1 (creating an eight-part
interim land use guidance policy prescribing general guidelines for land use amendments, includ-
ing accommodation of growth and development, the provision for a balanced housing supply,
protection of existing conservation lands, etc.).
230. See HAw. REv. STAT. tit. 13, § 205-16 (1976). In 1978, the state legislature also en-
acted a comprehensive state planning statute that is presently uncodified.
231. See note 187 supra.
232.' Under state law, each county is instructed to develop a long-range, comprehensive
plan to be effectuated by zoning; the zoning power is to be exercised by ordinances that can relate




Hawaii has no zoning referendum requirement at the present
time, but the Lieutenant Governor's proposed Aina Malama Amend-
ment would establish just such a mechanism. The lands to be preserved
would be designated "Aina Malama" and could only be classified as
such or reclassified for development by a vote of the people. In light of
the United States Supreme Court's decision in City of Eastlake,235 this
proposal would probably be constitutional.
Hawaii also has a tax incentive program designed to protect
agricultural lands. Under the taxation laws in the state, owners desiring
to use their land for ranching or other agricultural use and to have their
property assessed at its market value for such use, must dedicate their
lands for this purpose.236 If the dedication request is approved, the
owners forfeit the right to change the use of their lands for a period of
ten years.337 Owners may also voluntarily dedicate their lands for
twenty years, thus increasing their special tax assessment privilege.238
Under the ten-year plan, the land is valued at its highest and best agri-
cultural use; under the twenty-year plan, the land is assessed at fifty
percent of its highest and best agricultural use.239 Failure of the owners
to observe the restrictions on the use of their lands results in strict pen-
alties. Not only is the special tax assessment privilege cancelled retroac-
tively to the date of the petition for dedication, but all taxes that would
have been incurred pursuant to a regular assessment (less the amount
already paid) become due and payable, coupled with an annual penalty
of ten percent.240 Although these sanctions seem prohibitive, they may,
in fact, be minor compared to the profits earned by changing land from
an agricultural to an urban designation.
Hawaii thus already has several vehicles for an excellent
growth control program. What the state lacks are more specific guide-
234. See id.
235. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976). See notes 190-
93 and accompanying text supra.
236. See HAW. REv. STAT. tit. 14, §§ 246-12(a), 246-12(b) (1976).
237. Id. § 246-12(c).
238. Id. § 246-12(a).
239. Id. § 246-12(b).
240. Id. § 246-12(d) (Supp. 1977). The constitutionality of a similar statutory scheme re-
stricting land use has been upheld by one other state court. Andrews v. Lathrop, 132 Vt. 256, 315
A.2d 860 (1974) (upheld against constitutional challenge statutory scheme imposing special capital
gains tax on the sale or exchange of land held less that six years except those involving lots under
five acres that served as the taxpayer's residence; tax rates were proportional to the length of
time the land was held by the seller and the rate of gain. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 10001-
10010 (Supp. 1977)).
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lines to govern land use decisions. The merits of the mainland models
described are that they channel discretion and ensure greater consis-
tency and predictability.
C. The Problems of Existing Rights and Unsettled Native Claims
Complicating the problem of land use regulation in the islands is
the fact that the people of Hawaii have land use rights that are unique
in the United States.241 In addition, native Hawaiians have extensive
unsettled claims to land and payments that are currently under consid-
eration in Congress. Both these matters may give the state strong argu-
ments in favor of limiting population growth, particularly with respect
to the in-migration of newcomers.
1. Existing Rights of the People of Hawaii
Chapter seven of the Hawaii Revised Statutes states that even
after private owners obtain title to land, "the people" still retain certain
rights that cannot be taken away. Thus, section 7-1 states that the peo-
ple shall not be deprived of "the right to take firewood, house-timber,
aho cord, thatch, or ti leaf, from the land on which they live, for their
own private use. .... ,,242 Similarly, the statute states that the people
shall have the right to "drinking water, and running water, and the
right of way. The springs of water, running water, and roads shall be
free to all, on all lands granted in fee simple .... ,,24-
In addition, the Hawaii Supreme Court has ruled that the
public has rights in all of the beaches and coastlines of the islands. In
the case of the County of Hawaii v. Sotomura,244 the state court held in
a condemnation proceeding of beachfront property that "the land be-
low the 4shford seaward boundary line as to be redetermined belongs
to the State of Hawaii, and the defendants should not be compensated
therefor.' '245 Thus, in Sotomura the court held that the state owns the
land up to the vegetation line of the beach because local policy favors
241. See note 181 supra.
242. HAW. REv. STAT. tit. 1, § 7-1 (1976).
243. Id
244. 55 Haw. 176, 517 P.2d 57 (1973).
245. Id at 184, 517 P.2d at 63. The state court was referring to its prior decision in In re
Application of Ashford, 50 Haw. 314,440 P.2d 76 (1968), which held that a royal patent could not
convey land beyond the high water mark and thus held that the seaward boundary between public
and private beachfront property was "the upper reaches of the wash of waves, usually evidenced
by the edge of vegetation or by the line of debris." Id at 315, 440 P.2d at 77. See generally Town
& Yuen, Public Access to Beaches in Hawait '4 Social Necessity,' 10 HAw. B.J. 5 (1973); Note,
Hawaiian Beach 4ccess: A Customary Right, 26 HAsTINs L. J.823 (1975).
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extending to public use and ownership as much of Hawaii's shoreline
as is reasonably possible.
The full extent of the public's right of use over land and wa-
terways is still uncertain, but these statutes and cases clearly hold that
private rights of ownership are more restricted in Hawaii than in other
states. Property is not as freely available for purchase as elsewhere and
the rights of "owners" are severely limited. The state can therefore rea-
sonably argue that it has an obligation to discourage new migration to
the islands.
2 Unsettled Claims of Native Hawaiians
Native Hawaiians have often claimed that the division ef-
fected by the Great Mahele of 1848246 and subsequent land decisions
have illegally deprived them of their rights to ownership of land in the
islands. This claim has its basis in the totally different view toward
"property rights" held by Hawaiians in comparison with that held by
the Westerners who came to the islands during the nineteenth century.
In recent years, the legitimacy of the claims of native Hawaiians has
been recognized by many observers at the federal level.
On June 27, 1974, a bill was submitted to the United States
House of Representatives "to provide for the settlement of historic
claims of the Hawaiian Natives. '247 The bill, as originally drafted,
would have established a Hawaiian Native Fund of one billion dollars,
deposited in ten equal yearly amounts, to be administered by the Secre-
tary of Interior. Also, a corporation would be established to receive
these funds and disburse them to benefit native Hawaiians; the board
of directors of this corporation would be elected by such Hawaiians.
This drive for reparations was spearheaded by a group that called
themselves the "Aboriginal Lands of Hawaiian Ancestry" (ALOHA).
The movement has gained its momentum primarily because of the suc-
cess of the 1971 Alaska Natire Claims Settlement Act.248 Under the
Alaska law, various indigenous peoples received almost one billion dol-
lars and thirty-eight million acres of land. Native Hawaiians see many
similarities between their land claims and those of the native Alaskans.
In both cases, the argument is that the United States, without paying
compensation to the indigenous population, gained title to land in terri-
246. See note 181 supra.
247. Hawaiian Native Claims Settlement Act, H.R. 15666, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); 120
CONG. REc. 21706 (1974).
248. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628 (Supp. V 1975).
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tories that later became states. 249
More recently, a proposal in lieu of the 1974 Hawaiian claims
bill has been advanced by joint resolutions in the Ninety-Fifth Con-
gress. 250 Instead of directly making monetary reparations to the native
Hawaiians, these resolutions seek to establish a Hawaiian Native
Claims Settlement Study Commission. Within one year of its creation,
the commission would recommend to the Congress the alternatives by
which the latter body could proceed to redress the injuries inflicted
upon native Hawaiians. Because of this resolution, coupled with the
increasing activism of many Hawaiians seeking land reparations, it is
possible to argue that the State of Hawaii has a compelling interest in
preserving lands for the native populace and that the state must there-
fore limit population growth to ensure that some land remains avail-
able for the eventual settlement.
There also exists the problem of native Hawaiian land claims
against the federal government. Such claims can be compared to the
situation of the American Indians in which some compensation has
been allowed for the taking of tribal lands for governmental use. As
stated by the Supreme Court in Tee-hit-ton Indians v. United State: 5I
"Where the Congress by treaty or other agreement has declared that
thereafter Indians were to hold the lands permanently, compensation
must be paid for subsequent taking. ' 252 It could be argued that Native
Hawaiians have not yet received compensation for the less-than-fair
treatment they suffered at the hands of the western settlers of Hawaii.
For instance, questions are now being raised as to the legality and va-
lidity of the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy of Queen Lil-
liuokalani in 1893.253 The explanation given by John L. Stevens, the
United States Minister in Hawaii in 1893, was that in order to protect
American citizens and property, he was forced to order the landing of
marines in Honolulu to stop the Queen from restoring the monarchy.-54
However, President Grover Cleveland refused to submit the treaty of
249. See R. JONES, A HISTORY OF THE ALASKAN NATIVE CLAIMS (1973), in which it is
pointed out that in both the Alaska and Hawaii Organic Acts, Congress left open the possibility of
a future settlement of land claims.
250. See S.J. Res. 4, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); 123 CONG. Rnc. S17205 (daily ed., Oct.
17, 1977); id. S17378 (daily ed., Oct. 20, 1977); H.S.J. Res. 526, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); 123
CONG. REC. H6292 (daily ed., June 21, 1977).
251. 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
252. Id at 277-78. Accord, Sioux Tribe v. United States, 316 U.S. 317, 326 (1942); Chip-
pewa Indians v. United States, 301 U.S. 358, 375-76 (1937); Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299
U.S. 476, 497 (1937); United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1935).
253. See generally Levy, Native Hawaiian Land Rights, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 848 (1975).
254. M. TATE, THE UNITED STATES AND THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM 232 (1965).
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annexation of Hawaii in 1893 to the Senate, pointing to the unethical
role the United States had played in the acquisition of the islands in the
first place. His message to the Senate was:
But for the notorious predilections of the United States minister
for annexation, the committee of safety, which should be called the
committee of annexation, would never have existed.
But for the landing of the United States forces upon false pre-
texts respecting the danger to life and property the committee would
never have exposed themselves to the pains and penalties of treason
by undertaking the subversion of the Queen's Government.
But for the presence of the United States forces in the immedi-
ate vicinity and in position to afford all needed protection and sup-
port the committee would not have proclaimed the Provisional
Government from the steps of the Government building.2 55
Although the question has never been litigated in the courts, an
argument could thus be made that certain lands that were taken by the
federal government during the overthrow of 1893 should be returned to
the native Hawaiians. Senate Joint Resolution four, currently under
consideration in Congress, would provide a substantial basis for this
conclusion because it states that "the Congress hereby declares that a
wrong has been committed against the Aboriginal Hawaiians which the
United States is obligated to endeavor to remedy."2 56 Therefore, the
state can argue that it must discourage migration to the islands to pro-
tect the unsettled claims of native Hawaiians.
D. The Taking Issue
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just
compensation .... ,,257 This requirement is made applicable to state
governmental action by the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment
that a state shall not "deprive any person of. .. property, without due
process of law. .... ,"258 Article one, section eighteen, of the Hawaii
Constitution also states: "Private property shall not be taken or dam-
aged for public use without just compensation."2 59 With respect to land
use controls in Hawaii, these requirements pose at least three signifi-
cant questions: (1) Under what circumstances is the state constitution-
255. President's Message to Congress Relating to the Hawaiian Islands, H.R. ExEc. Doc.
No. 47, 53rd Cong., 2d Sess., XIII (1893); 26 CONG. REc. 309, 312 (1893).
256. S.J. Res. 4, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); 123 CONG. REc. S17378 (daily ed. Oct. 20,
1977).
257. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
258. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
259. HAw. CONsT. art. 1, § 18.
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ally obligated to compensate a landowner whose property is subjected
to land use controls? (2) If "just compensation" is required, how is it to
be measured? (3) If "just compensation" is not required, when should
some compensation nevertheless be paid?
1. Compensable Takings
Professor Frank Michelman has identified the general princi-
ples of law applicable to the just compensation requirement:
Examination of judicial decisions and of legal commentary fo-
cused on them indicates that one of four factors has usually been
deemed critical in classifying an occasion as compensable or not: (1)
whether or not the public or its agents have physically used or occu-
pied something belonging to the claimant; (2) the size of the harm
sustained by the claimant or the degree to which his affected prop-
erty has been devalued; (3) whether the claimant's loss is or is not
outweighed by the public's concomitant gain; (4) whether the claim-
ant has sustained any loss apart from restriction of his liberty to con-
duct some activity considered harmful to other people.260
More specifically, the following points should be emphasized with re-
spect to certain land use problems and potential regulatory techniques
in Hawaii. First, a diminution in the value of a piece of property by
virtue of governmental action that makes changes in the currently per-
mitted uses of that property more difficult will probably not be com-
pensable if the currently permitted uses are economically reasonable
ones.261 Thus, Hawaiian regulations that would make it more difficult
for land now limited to agricultural uses to be made available for hous-
ing developments could probably be adopted without providing for
compensation. Indeed, some courts have recently ruled that a state's
interest in protecting its environment is sufficient to enable it to pre-
serve private property in its natural condition, even though the restric-
tion may confine use of that property to limited agricultural,
horticultural or recreational purposes.262 This line of authority may be
260. Michelman, Property Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
'Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165, 1183-84 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Michelman]. See generally F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973).
261. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887); D. GODSCHALK, D. BROWER, L.
McBENNETT & B. VESTAL, CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES OF GROWTH MANAGEMENT 58-60 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES]; J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTrru-
TIONAL LAW 440-50 (1978).
262. See, e.g., CEEED v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 43 Cal. App. 3d
306, 118 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1974) (sustained coastal initiative restrictions on development in permit
areas pending formulation of a coastal zone plan so that development would not irreversibly com-
mit resources to uses inconsistent with that plan); Rockville Fuel & Feed Co. Inc., v. City of
Gaithersburg, 266 Md. 117, 291 A.2d 672 (1972) (sustained zoning amendment preventing con-
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quite significant with respect to the preservation of Hawaiian swamp
lands.
Second, a regulation that prohibits a previously permitted use of
property may constitute a compensable taking if it results in too great a
reduction in the value of the property. This is referred to as the diminu-
tion in value test:
While some writers have urged a 50 per cent standard and
others have calculated the point at which a taking is found to have
occurred to average closer to 80 per cent, the degree of dimunition of
property value sufficient to invalidate a regulation remains uncer-
tain. Despite the lack of a single standard, this test is widely applied
and is one of the two tests most likely to be used in growth manage-
ment litigation.263
In applying this test, however, the appropriate measures of original and
diminished value are crucial.264 The recent decision of the New York
struction of a concrete plant where it was shown that the amendment was to be followed by a
comprehensive ordinance barring industrial uses from the "historic heart of the City"); Turnpike
Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 362 Mass. 221, 284 N.E.2d 891 (1972) (sustained law restricting
use of property in "flood plain" to protect neighboring lands and render unnecessary public flood
control and relief expenditures); Meadowlands Regional Development Corp. Agency v. State, 112
N.J. Super. 89, 270 A.2d 418 (1970) (sustained reclamation act for state meadowlands that limited
the uses to which owners ofsuch lands could put their property); Just v. Marinette County, 56
Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W. 2d 761 (1972) (sustained law specifying that use of wetland property would be
restricted in order to safeguard the water purity and scenic aspects of a nearby lake).
263. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES, uapra note 261, at 59. The status of the dimunition of value
test in the Supreme Court is unsettled, although it formed the rationale for a number of important
decisions on the taking issue. See, eg., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,48 (1960); Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922); Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter,
209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908); Interstate Consol. St. Ry. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79, 87 (1907). See
also Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962). But in other cases the Court has
found proof of dimunition of value immaterial. See, e.g., Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328
U.S. 80, 82-83 (1946); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1928); Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388-89 (1926); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 US. 394, 409-10 (1915).
See generally Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 41-46 (1964).
264. The measure utilized by the Supreme Court was discussed recently in United States v.
Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973), a proceeding initiated by the government to condemn 920 acres of
grazing lands. The Court observed that although the usual test is the fair market value of the
property taken, that standard is to be applied in light of basic equitable principles of fairness. Id.
at 490. It then proceeded to point out that fair market value will not include any appreciation in
value caused by the government's own actions. Id at 491(citing United States v. Cors, 337 U.S.
325, 334 (1949), in which the Court had previously held just compensation for requisitioned tug
could not include appreciation in value of such a vessel caused by the government's increased
wartime needs). The Court in Fullertherefore held that the value of the grazing land condemned
could not include any element based on the use of the respondents' fee lands in conjunction with
grazing land that they also utilized pursuant to a federal permit under the Taylor Grazing Act, 43
U.S.C. § 315b (1970). 409 U.S. at 493. See also United States v. 41,098.98 Acres of Land, 548
F.2d 911, 915 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. 161 Acres of Land, 427 F. Supp. 582, 584 (D. Colo.
1977).
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Court of Appeals in Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of
New York265 is significant with respect to measurements of value. In
this case, the court sustained a restriction against the construction of an
office building atop Grand Central Station, an officially designated
historical landmark owned by Penn Central. It did so for three reasons:
(1) the value of the property for development was "created not so much
by the efforts of the property owner, but instead by the accumulated
indirect social and direct governmental investment in the physical
property, its functions, and its surroundings"; 266 (2) the value of the
property as restricted must be viewed in light of the contribution the
station makes to the profitability of Penn Centrars other "heavy real
estate holdings in the Grand Central area, including hotels and office
buildings"; 267 and (3) under the regulation, Penn Central was still per-
mitted to transfer its development rights over the station to other
properties in the vicinity that it owned or that were owned by others.268
Each of these reasons suggest bases on which previously permitted uses
of property in Hawaii might be prohibited for legitimate public pur-
poses without the payment of compensation. Some courts and com-
mentators would impose an even less strict compensation requirement
on governmental regulations of property. Professor John Costonis finds
some support in judicial precedent for a test that would require com-
pensation for the prohibition of previously permitted uses only if the
regulation denied the property owner any "reasonable beneficial use"
of the property, which is defined as "an intensity of development po-
tential" that would "allow the landowner a reasonable economic re-
turn. .... "269 Obviously, the reasoning of the court in the Penn Central
case would also be relevant in the application of such a "reasonable
beneficial use" test.
Third, the State of Hawaii appears to have considerable leeway in
imposing moratoria on the development of property within its borders,
even in accordance with currently permitted uses. The leading case on
265. 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977), afrd, 46 U.S.L.W. 4856
(U.S. June 26, 1978). For a discussion of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in this
case, see notes 306-315 and accompanying text infra. See Costonis, The Diparityfssue:A Context
for the Grand Central Terminal Decisiont 91 HARV. L. REv. 402 (1977).
266. 42 N.Y.2d at 331-32, 366 N.E.2d at 1275-76, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
267. Id at 333, 366 N.E.2d at 1276, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 920.
268. Id. at 334, 366 N.E.2d at 1277, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 920.
269. Costonis, "Fair" Compensation andthe Accommodation Power:.4ntidotesfor the Taking
Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1021, 1049-52 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Costonis]. See also Berger, The Accommodation Power in Land Use Controversies: A Reply to Pro-
fessor Costonis, 76 COLuM. L. REv. 799 (1976).
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such moratoria is Golden v. Planning Board of Town of Ramapo,270 in
which the New York Court of Appeals upheld Ramapo's "over-all pro-
gram of orderly growth and adequate facilities," which embodied "a
sequential development policy commensurate with progressing availa-
bility and capacity of public facilities," 27' even though this program
could have resulted in a postponement of the subdivision development
of some parcels of land for as long as eighteen years.272 According to
Professor Costonis,
What saved the plan from being confiscatory was, in ... [the
court's] view, its deliberate inclusion of factors that mitigated its
otherwise draconian impact and thereby satisfied fundamental con-
siderations of fairness. Among the factors which elevated the eco-
nomic return on affected lands from what was surely a negative
value to what the majority found to be a Reasonable Beneficial Use
return were: a residual right to construct a single family residence on
plattable land; an interim reduction in real estate taxes keyed to the
depreciation caused by the restrictions; an option afforded to the
landowner to accelerate the construction date by providing the requi-
site public facilities; the right to proceed with development in accord-
ance with the town's capital improvements timetable, whether or not
the town met that timetable; the present vesting and assignability of
the future right to develop; the benefit of substantial incremental val-
ues that would accrue in time to the restricted land as a consequence
of the phased installation of public facilities pursuant to a carefully
elaborated comprehensive plan; and the "temporary" nature of the
restrictions, which were imposed, not to enhance the town's resource
position, but to coordinate private advantage with public facilities
and needs.273
2. Just Compensation
Professor Costonis has also argued that a land use regulation
that does not allow for any "reasonable beneficial use" of the subject
property may nevertheless be sustained if the regulation provides com-
pensation for the difference between the value of the property as regu-
lated and its value with respect to some "reasonable beneficial use."'274
It is equally possible that a landowner who was not offered such lim-
ited compensation could constitutionally be restricted, in terms of re-
270. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972), appeal dsmissed, 409 U.S.
1003 (1972). See notes 195-20 and accompanying text supra.
271. 30 N.Y. 2d at 369, 285 N.E.2d at 296, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 144. See generally Note, Phased
Zoning: Regulation ofthe Tempo and Sequence of LandDevelopment, 26 STAN. L. REv. 585 (1974).
272. See note 197 and accompanying text supra.
273. Costonis, supra note 269, at 1056-57 (footnote omitted).
274. Id at 1051-52. See generally Hagman, Compensible Regulation: 4 Way of Dealing
with JVqveoutsfrom Land Use Control, 54 U. DET. J. URB. L. 45 (1977).
Spring 19781
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
lief, to an action for damages to recover it.275 The traditional approach,
however, has been for the courts to invalidate regulations that amount
to compensable takings, leaving a state with only the alternative of ex-
ercising its eminent domain powers and paying "just compensation"
for the entire fee interest in the properties that it still wishes to subject
to its control. Under such an approach, "the valuation formula now
applied takes as its measure the condemned parcel's 'highest and best
use under existing or reasonablyprobable land use controls.' "276
Thus, if Hawaiian regulations that make changes in the cur-
rently permitted uses of property more difficult are deemed to be com-
pensable takings and the state is forced to condemn the property to
preserve the existing uses, some compensation would have to be paid
under the traditional approach for potential expansions in permitted
uses that could have been anticipated. Professor Costonis has protested
against this additional measure of compensation, arguing that it "un-
dercuts public governance as a valuation constraint," and calling it a
"premium, which is solely the product of public action .... ,,277 Once
again, however, the reasoning of the New York Court of Appeals in the
Penn Central case 278 may be pointing the way toward new valuation
standards, which would exclude even currently-permitted-use measures
of valuation to the extent that they are attributable to social and gov-
ernmental contributions and which would exclude values based on an-
ticipated use changes.279 In Sweden, for example, there is no "just
compensation" requirement but under that nation's Expropriation Act,
market value is the standard governing compensation. 280 Nevertheless,
under the same law,
value increases occurring during the 10 years prior to expropriation
will not be compensated unless the owner can show that they derive
from some source other than expectations of changes in permitted
uses.... [the theory being that] the municipality should not have to
compensate expectation values derived principally from the munici-
pality's efforts in planning, developing, and regulating the
community.281
275. See Bosselman, The Third Alternative in Zoning Litigation, 17 ZONING DIG. 73, 112
(1965).
276. Costonis, supra note 269, at 1043 (emphasis in original).
277. Id at 1043-44.
278. Penn Cent. Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271,
397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977). See notes 265-268 and accompanying text supra.
279. See Costonis, supra note 269, at 1044 n. 103.
280. Expropriation Act, ch. 4, § 1, SVENSK FORFATrNINGSSAMLING 1972, 719 at 6.
281. Hildreth, Coastal Land Use Control in Sweden, 2 COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT J. 1,
16-17 (1975).
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3. Voluntary Payments of Compensation
As has been previously noted, most land use regulations that
merely diminish the value of certain pieces of property do not consti-
tute "takings" for which compensation is required. Considerations of
fairness and practicality, however, might still indicate that a state
should pay at least some compensation to some landowners in certain
circumstances. 282
Land use regulations are justified only when they are calcu-
lated to result in net benefits to the public, le., benefits from the regu-
lations that exceed the burdens imposed by those regulations.
Regulations that quite obviously fail to satisfy this net-benefit test and
which provide no compensation for the burdens they impose, are likely
to be struck down by the courts as unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious
or as not designed to serve a public purpose.283 With regard to land use
regulations that satisfy the net-benefit test, however, a principal argu-
ment against the voluntary payment of compensation is that it is proce-
durally expensive to determine exactly who has been injured by such
regulations and the extent to which each has been injured. These "set-
tlement costs" or "process costs" would reduce the net benefits to the
public from the regulations.284 Nevertheless, a strong ethical argument
can be made that, absent a specific intention to redistribute wealth,285 it
is inherently unfair to provide regulatory benefits to some people by
imposing uncompensated regulatory burdens on others.286 A second ar-
gument against payments to compensate for particular burdens is that,
so long as all land use and other regulations are required to satisfy the
282. See Michelman, supra note 260, at 1250-53:
We should notice the occasions upon which courts, in the course of rejecting plausible
claims to compensation, trouble to observe that the legislature might, if it pleased, pro-
vide the compensation which the court cannot bring itself to exact. How can it be that
payments of public funds to private individuals, not in satisfaction of legal liabilities of
state or nation and not noticeably in pursuit of the "general welfare" (unless the general
welfare embraces the need to satisfy the demands of fairness) would not be "waste" or
"gifts" of public assets? The message seems to be that the courts recognize that they
cannot, through the enunciation of doctrine which decides cases, adequately stake out
the limits of fair treatment; that if the quest for fairness is left to a series of occasional
encounters between courts and public administrators it can but partially be fulfilled; and
that the political branches, accordingly, labor under their own obligations to avoid un-
fairness regardless of what the courts may require.
Id. at 1252 (footnotes omitted). The references cited in notes 283-293 infra, are to discussions of
certain general concepts with respect to compensation that are drawn upon in the text; these dis-
cussions do not deal specifically with voluntary payments.
283. See id. at 1195-96.
284. See id. at 1214; B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTrrTiON 45-46,
73-76 (1977) [hereinafter cited as AcKERMAN].
285. See Michelman, supra note 260, at 1181-83; ACKERMAN, supra note 284, at 58.
286. See ACKERMAN, supra note 284, at 72-73.
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net-benefit test, then the benefits obtained by individual persons from
all such regulations will ultimately outweigh the burdens.28 7 In re-
sponse to this contention, however, one could argue that is unrealistic
to think in these terms for persons who suffer major losses as a result of
the implementation of land use controls. 288
Apart from considerations of fairness, certain practical con-
siderations also militate in favor of voluntary payments of compensa-
tion to landowners who would be injured by land use regulations.
Politically, it might be much easier to secure the adoption of such regu-
lations if compensation were to be paid.289 Moreover, the failure to
provide at least a reasonable amount of compensation could result in
such high "costs" in the form of economic uncertainty, causing people
to hesitate in making useful investments, 290 and political turmoil,291
that the regulations in question would actually result in little or no net
public benefit. Of course, neither fairness nor political or economic
considerations require that a state compensate landowners for all losses
arising from the continuation or imposition of land use controls. Per-
sons who purchase property with the hope that current restrictions on
its use might be lifted, at prices far below the value of the property if
the restrictions were not in effect, cannot reasonably complain if their
gamble does not succeed.292 And even the justifiable expectations of
long-term landowners may be undercut by "early warnings" from the
state or county governments, to the effect that new land use regulations
might be imposed or that existing ones might be made more
stringent.293
IV. Legal Issues Related to Limiting Automobiles
State policies that limit automobile ownership, or curtail the use
of automobiles, in the interests of combatting loise and air pollution
and preserving the natural beauty of the state could also have the indi-
rect effect of discouraging the in-migration of persons who place a high
value on the availability of a rapid means of personal transportation.
The problem is particularly pronounced in Hawaii. Oahu's streets may
be approaching a congested level and the energy prospects for the fu-
287. See Michelman, supra note 260, at 1225-26.
288. See id
289. See ACKERMAN, supra note 284, at 55-56.
290. See id at 44-45.
291. See id at 46-47.
292. See Michelman, supra note 260, at 1237-38.
293. See id at 1238.
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ture indicate that the state's motorists may not be able to rely on oil as a
cheap fuel to provide them with convenient automobile transportation.
In response to a statutory provision advocating a limitation of vehi-
cles, 294 the State Department of Transportation issued a report on De-
cember 30, 1976, identifying four "constitutional problems" that may
arise if the state passed a~law setting a limit on the number of vehicles
allowable within its borders: problems involving the right of interstate
travel, the commerce clause, due process and equal protection
clauses.295 In fact, however, these constitutional "problems" are not
major obstacles to a limitation of vehicular use, and the state should
feel free to pursue various alternatives limiting the number of vehicles.
A. The Individual's Right of Interstate Travel
Although the United States Supreme Court has protected the right
to travel in a number of different contexts, the Court has never stated
that a person has the right to travel by any particular mode of transpor-
tation. Thus, as long as some modes of transportation to and within
Hawaii are available, a limitation on automobile use would not inter-
fere with the right to travel. Indeed, the Court has recently permitted
airport taxes that do inhibit travel by raising the costs thereof, if the
taxes are reasonably related to the costs of operating the airport or
otherwise policing air traffic. 296
It might be argued that because federal funds are used to build
and maintain Hawaii's two freeways the state cannot interfere with ac-
cess to those thoroughfares. But Hawaii-like all other states-already
interferes with access to these routes in many ways and no one has ever
argued that such state regulation is improper. For example, in order to
use the intrastate freeways one must obtain a Hawaii driver's license,
comply with the state's safety inspection and registration requirements
and adhere to speed limits that are set by the state and enforced by
Hawaiian police officers. Thus, although the federal government does
finance the construction and maintenance of these routes, the states
have always had primary responsibility for regulation of traffic and a
state effort to limit automobile use based on valid state goals and not
designed to discriminate against interstate commerce would fall within
294. HAw. REv. STAT. tit. 15, § 279-A(9) (1976).
295. See HAWAII STATE DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, REPORT TO THE NINTH STATE LEG-
ISLATURE REGULAR SESSION OF 1977 ON HAWAII REvisED STATUTES CHAPTER 279-A SECTION 9,
SUBJEcr LIMITING TRANSPORTATION UNrS 9 (1976) [hereinafter cited as TRANSPORT REPORT].
296. Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport v. Delta Airlines, 405 U.S. 707, 715-21 (1972).
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this area of state power.297
B. The Commerce Clause
A state cannot interfere with the free flow of interstate commerce
unless the benefits to the state in terms of increased health and safety
outweigh the burdens imposed on commerce.298 Thus, it could be ar-
gued that state limitations on vehicles interfere with commercial move-
ments that require vehicular transportation and also interfere with the
free movement of an item of commerce, t e., the vehicles themselves. In
response to such a challenge, the state would have to show some health
and safety benefits accruing to itself and its residents as a result of the
limitations. If such a showing were made, then the Court would defer
to the state legislature's judgment and permit the regulation to stand.
What type of a showing would be necessary? The Court has been
297. In the case of South Carolina State Hwy. Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177
(1938), the Supreme Court upheld a South Carolina weight and size ordinance that effectively
prohibited ninety percent of all trucks serving interstate commerce from being driven through the
state. In doing so, it observed that highways were within the local control of the states and that the
states had primary responsibility for their maintenance and regulation. Id at 184-85. Recent
lower court decisions have cited Barnwell Bros. for the propositions that state infringement of
interstate commerce must be scrutinized under a balancing test or that regulatory means adopted
by the state must reasonably relate to the end that it seeks to achieve. See Aldens, Inc. v. LaFol-
lette, 552 F.2d 745, 753 (7th Cir. 1977); Proctor & Gamble Co. v. City of Chicago, 509 F.2d 69, 75
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975); National Aviation v. City of Hayward, 418 F. Supp.
417, 425 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 417 F. Supp. 1352, 1358-59
(W.D. Wis. 1976), rev'4 98 S. Ct. 787 (1978); Trescott v. Conner, 390 F. Supp. 765, 767 (N.D. Fla.
1975); Aldens, Inc. v. Packel, 379 F. Supp. 521, 527, 529 (M.D. Pa. 1974); However, in the Ray-
mond Motor case, which involved a challenge to various Wisconsin laws imposing a fifty-five foot
length limitation on trucks being operated on the state's highways without a special permit, the
Supreme Court did indicate that to the extent that Barnwell Bros. established a rational relation-
ship standard for judging the constitutionality of state laws regulating the channels of interstate
commerce, it had been superseded by the case of Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520
(1959), which asserted that the true standard was whether "'the total effect of the law as a safety
measure in reducing accidents and casualties is so slight or problematical so as not to outweigh the
national interest in keeping interstate commerce free from interferences which seriously impede
it.'" Id at 524 (quoting Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 775-76 (1945)). The court in
RaymondMotors did not, however, overrule Barnwell Bros. in toto. See Raymond Motor Transp.,
Inc. v. Rice, 98 S. Ct. at 795. Indeed, the Court examined the evidence concerning traffic safety
carefully and concluded that the Wisconsin length limitations did not actually promote safety.
Id at 795-96. It also found some discrimination in favor of Wisconsin industries in the way in
which the statutes had been applied. Id. at 797. The full import of the case in unclear, but the
majority opinion acknowledged that "[o]ur holding is a narrow one," id., so states probably retain
considerable discretion to regulate transportation within their borders.
298. See, e.g., Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 98 S. Ct. 787, 795 (1978); Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362
U.S. 440, 443-44 (1960); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 524 (1959); Southern
Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 775-76 (1945). See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, J.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 252-56 (1978).
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sympathetic to environmental concerns 299 and might very well accept a
state's contention that its limitation on vehicles is justified by the
health, safety, and overall environmental benefits that would accrue
from such a limitation. The state's case would be particularly strong if
only oversized cars were banned or if the limitation on automobiles is
accompanied by purchases of other vehicles, such as buses. Under such
an approach, it could be effectively argued that the net impact of the
state's scheme would not be a burden on commerce but only a restruc-
turing of commercial activity.
C. The Due Process Clause
The Department of Transportation's report states that a court will
require that any vehicular limitation "have a real and substantial rela-
tion to the purpose sought to be accomplished; if the purpose of the
legislation can be achieved through a less drastic or simpler means, the
regulation will generally be held to be excessive. '' 3°° No citation is
given for this proposition. Indeed, the state of the law is such that a
federal court would scrutinize such a statute under a much less rigorous
standard, requiring only some rational basis for its enactment.
In the realm of economics and social welfare, the United States
Supreme Court has decided that democratically-elected legislatures
should be given a free hand to balance competing societal interests and
that it is improper for components of the judiciary to substitute their
own judgment in place of the legislative decision. As long as the legisla-
ture has some rational basis for its conclusion, the Court will defer to
that judgment even if it is not the same conclusion that the judges
would have reached had they been legislators.301 In the context of ve-
hicular use restrictions, the Court would undoubtedly defer to the judg-
ment of a state legislature, as long as that judgment rests upon some
plausible basis, because the decision is one calling for a balancing of
competing economic and social value choices. If the lawmakers are at-
tempting in good faith to solve problems of traffic congestion, pollution
299. See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442-43 (1960). But
where the state seeks to protect its environment through means that conflict with federal controls,
its efforts may be invalidated under the preemption doctrine. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
98 S. Ct. 988, 998 (1978).
300. TRANSPORT REPORT supra note 295, at 9.
301. See, e.g., County Bd. of Arlington County v. Richards, 98 S. Ct. 24,26 (1977); Dean v.
Gadsden Times Publishing Corp., 412 U.S. 543, 544-45 (1973); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471, 485 (1970); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-89 (1955); Day-Brite Lighting,
Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S 421, 424-25 (1952).
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and energy waste, and if alternative methods of transportation are pro-
vided, then the vehicle limitation would certainly be constitutional.
D. The Equal Protection Clause
The Department of Transportation's report argues that a vehicu-
lar limitation might discriminate against recent immigrants to the is-
lands and thus violate their right to equal protection. The distribution
of vehicles in our society is already discriminatory in the sense that one
can obtain a vehicle only if one has the requisite funds and one can
drive it only after reaching a specified age and passing certain stan-
dardized tests. But such discriminations have not been subject to close
scrutiny because they are based on reasonable legislative judgments
about how commodities and opportunities should be distributed.302 A
limitation on vehicles would also have to meet this minimal level of
scrutiny and might be struck down if certain categories of persons were
denied the opportunity to obtain vehicles either categorically or only
after long waiting periods. If, on the other hand, the legislature estab-
lishes priorities in terms of need or family size and allows everyone to
compete equally for the privilege of obtaining a vehicle, a court would
surely defer to this legislative judgment. The court would also defer if a
short waiting period were required before one could obtain a permit to
operate a vehicle, as long as the period prescribed is related to reason-
able administrative needs of the vehicular limitation law. The court is
particularly likely to accept the limitation on vehicles if alternative
methods of travel are freely available to all.
Thus, because state legislatures have traditionally regulated trans-
portation, it is hard to imagine a court striking down a good faith legis-
lative effort to reduce congestion, pollution, energy waste and other
environmental hazards by limiting vehicles. Vehicular use has always
been subject to careful regulation. As long as other methods of travel
are provided, the legislature should feel free to impose any form of
limitation on such use.30 3
302. For the appropriate standard by which such cases are reviewed in the United States
Supreme Court, see note 115 supra.
303. Indeed, an example of how such vehicular control could be accomplished is exempli-
fied by the experience of Bermuda. That country, consisting of an island of only twenty square
miles, had a population of 52,330 in 1970 and a total of 10,494 private private passenger
automobiles, oi a ratio of one vehicle for every five persons. BERMUDA FOREIGN AND COMMON-
WEALTH OFFICE, BERMUDA TRAFFIC REPORT FOR THE YEAR 1971, at 30, 60 (1975). The island
has managed to maintain such a low ratio by limiting the number of automobiles to one per
household and restricting the size of vehicles in terms of engine capacity and wheelbase length.
Bermuda Motor Car Act of 1951, BERMUDA STATS. tit. 21, item 4 (1951) (amended 1971). See
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Conclusion
This article has both surveyed the attempts by Hawaii and other
communities to limit their growth and examined the judicial decisions
governing direct and indirect growth control techniques. The federal
courts have sometimes permitted the state to protect its own natural
resources and have frequently permitted states to control and regulate
matters that are local in scope even if incidental discriminations result.
The Supreme Court has for some years been sympathetic toward a
state's efforts to protect its environment and has generally permitted
local regulation of the environment even when that regulation inter-
feres with interstate commerce or the interest of national uniformity.
The use of residency requirements to manage growth is, by itself,
constitutionally vulnerable. Such an approach may be defensible, how-
ever, if it is applied only to jobs that truly require knowledge of local
conditions (such as service as a police officer or as a policy-making
official in state or county government) or if it is part of a comprehen-
sive plan to protect a state's natural and cultural resources. Reduced in-
migration might also be a permissible result of reasonable measures to
alleviate the state's pressing unemployment, welfare and environmental
problems. Similarly, the Supreme Court has permitted local jurisdic-
tions to require that its employees actually reside within the jurisdiction
and it can therefore be argued that a state could require a person to be
an actual resident before he or she could apply for a job within its
borders. If a local regulation does discriminate against residents of
other states, even incidentally, the federal court will carefully examine
the state's motive and methods in order to ensure that such discrimina-
tion is not the real motive for enacting that regulation. The state may
therefore defend its regulation more persuasively if it has adopted a
comprehensive approach toward growth control and is pursuing this
goal aggressively and consistently, demanding sacrifices of its own citi-
zens as well as those of other states. Of course, it would be impermissi-
ble for a state to erect barriers against the poor from other states while
also CAL. VEH. CODE § 21100.5 (West Supp. 1978) (enabling Catalina Island to regulate the
number of vehicles on its streets).
The Hawaii legislature has also considered similar approaches. In 1967, it consid-
ered Senate Bill 1093, which would have prescribed that passenger automobiles purchased after
1973 would be limited to a maximum of 3200 pounds and 196 inches in length. In 1975, House
Bill 1508 was introduced, which would have placed on annual tax on automobiles with a gradu-
ated increase from 1/2 cent per pound for automobiles weighing 2,999 pounds or less to 1-1/4
cents per pound for automobiles weighing 5,000 pounds or more; in addition, the incidence of
vehicle registration tax would have been correlated to the weight of a vehicle. Neither of these
measures passed the state legislature.
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still allowing wealthy immigrants to enter. Residency requirements af-
fecting only welfare recipients are, therefore, the most difficult for a
state to defend.
The utilization of land use controls that can reduce the impact of
population growth and thus deter growth by controlling expansion also
represents a promising means of regulation, although the Hawaiian
system is flawed as a practical matter due to the lack of specific deci-
sion-making guidelines. The Supreme Court ruled two years ago that
communities could require voter approval by referendum of all
changes in land classification or zoning.304 The lieutenant governor of
Hawaii has drafted a proposed constitutional amendment that would
adopt this approach. Arguments can be made for and against this pro-
posal, but it has its merits and certainly does not appear to be constitu-
tionally infirm.
Similarly, the state has wide leeway to regulate land use without
being obliged to compensate landowners for lost profits. Although
compensation may be appropriate in many cases because of considera-
tions of fairness, the courts have been reluctant to require compensa-
tion if the regulation is designed to preserve environmentally sensitive
land in its natural state or if some reasonable use for the land remains.
Some caution is necessary, however. The holding of the New York
Court of Appeals in the Penn Central case305 that part of the increased
value of property taken by the state cannot be claimed by the "owner"
because of the publics contribution to that increase has broad implica-
tion. It could mean that private property owners can only claim as the
fair value of "their" property the value actually resulting from their
contributions to the property. Increases attributable to public decisions
or fortuitous events would not be subject to compensation. If this deci-
sion is followed, then the state might be permitted to acquire land at
less expense to set up agricultural parks, land trusts and carefully
planned housing. The state would certainly be freer, under the New
York view, to restrain development without having to pay the full cost.
Finally, with respect to state limitations on vehicular use or own-
ership, the federal Constitution imposes no substantial obstacles. A
state can freely regulate driving and parking, as long as alternative
means of transportation are provided. If the state does nothing to cur-
304. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976). Seenotes 190-
193 and accompanying text supra.
305. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397
N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977), affd, 46 U.S.L.W. 4856 (U.S. June 26, 1978). See notes 265-268 and accom-
panying text supra.
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tail automobile use and continues to encourage such use by the con-
struction of additional freeways, however, then a federal court may
view other state efforts at growth with suspicion and may strike them
down because of the absence of a consistent and comprehensive
approach.
Postscript
During the final week of its 1977-78 Term, the United States
Supreme Court handed down three decisions of considerable signifi-
cance for the future of growth management in Hawaii.
In Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New York,30 6
the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the New York Court of
Appeals that a historical landmark law restricting the construction of a
proposed office building over fifty stories in height atop Penn Central's
Grand Central Station did not constitute a taking of the company's
property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment.30 7  Agreeing with Penn Central's concession that the test for
compensability with regard to land use regulations generally is not the
degree to which the value of the subject property would be dimin-
ished,308 but rather the remaining value of "the uses the regulations
permit, ' 30 9 the Supreme Court nevertheless rejected the company's ar-
guments that the former test should be applied in the case of landmark
preservation restrictions.31 ° It observed that while the New York stat-
ute might have a greater impact on some landowners, that fact could
not serve as a basis for distinguishing the landmark law from general
zoning ordinances, which might also operate with disproportionate se-
verity.31 I The Court concluded that the remaining permitted uses of
the Grand Central Station property-including the continued ability of
the appellant to operate a railroad terminal containing office spaces
and concessions, the possibility of obtaining approval for the construc-
tion of a smaller office building in the superadjacent air space and the
306. 46 U.S.L.W. 4856 (U.S. June 26, 1978).
307. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 324, 397
N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977). See notes 265-268 and accompanying text supra.
308. For a discussion prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Penn Centralofa diminution
in value standard, see note 263 and accompanying text supra.
309. 46 U.S.L.W. at 4863.
310. Id at 4864.
311. Id
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fact that the value of development rights in that air space had been
transferred by the city to eight other nearby sites-allowed the Com-
pany "not only to profit from the Terminal but [an opportunity] to ob-
tain a 'reasonable return' on its investment. '312
The Court in Penn Central explicitly refrained from passing upon
"the question whether it is permissible or feasible to separate out the
'social increments' of the value of property" 3 13 to reduce the investment
basis upon which a reasonable return must be allowed to avoid a com-
pensable taking-an innovative analysis that had been undertaken by
the New York Court of Appeals.314 However, in holding that previ-
ously permitted uses of property may be prohibited without the pay-
ment of compensation so long as the owner continues to have
"reasonable beneficial use" of that property,315 the Supreme Court has
sanctioned possibly quite far-reaching land use controls to preserve
Hawaii's environment.
Concerning state residency requirements for employment, the
Supreme Court held unanimously in Hicklin v. Orbeck3t6 that the
Alaska statute which required private employers to give persons who
had already assumed residence in Alaska a preference over non-res-
idents on jobs resulting from the exploitation of the state's oil and gas
resources317 unconstitutionally abridged the privileges and immunities
of United States citizens.318 However, the impact of this decision with
respect to the constitutionality of Hawaii's act 101,319 which imposes a
similar "assumption of residency" requirement for most positions in
public employment, is unclear for several reasons.3 23
First, the Court in Hicklin did not discuss assumption of residency
prerequisites applicable only to public employment, indeed, it empha-
sized that the Alaska requirement could not be justified by reference to
312. Id. at 4865.
313. Id. at 4861 n.23. The Supreme Court observed, inter alia, that the "record upon which
the Court of Appeals decided the case did not... contain a basis for segregating the privately
created from the publicly created elements of the value of the Terminal site. Id
314. See notes 266 and 305 and accompanying text supra.
315. 46 U.S.L.W. 4865. For a discussion of the "reasonable beneficial use" standard, see
note 270 and accompanying text supra.
316. 46 U.S.L.W. 4773 (U.S. June 22, 1978).
317. See note 50 supra.
318. See U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2. The decision of the Alaska Supreme Court, which the
United States Supreme Court reversed, is discussed in the text accompanying notes 153-167 supra.
319. Haw. Sess. Laws 1978, act 101. See note 13 supra.
320. For a discussion prior to the Supreme Court's decision in HickJin of the constitutional-
ity of "assumption of residency" requirements, see text accompanying notes 149-180 supra.
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the state's ownership of its natural resources 32  because the require-
ment applied even to private employers who "have no connection
whatsoever with the State's oil and gas, perform no work on state land,
have no contractual relationship with the State, and receive no pay-
ment from the State. ' 322  This reasoning leaves open the possibility
that the Court would sustain "assumption-of-residency" requirements
applicable only to positions in public employment by treating such po-
sitions either as state "resources" 323 or as attributes of state sover-
eignty.3 24  Second, the Court did not rule that laws requiring
discrimination against non-residents in private sector employment are
invalid per se as a means of alleviating local unemployment.325 The
Court went no further than to characterize this strategy of discrimina-
tion as "at least dubious" constitutionally,326 and as presenting "serious
constitutional questions. ' 327  Third, the Court observed that even as-
suming that such a strategy were permissible, the Alaska Hire law was
nevertheless defective because the state had both failed to establish that
non-residents were "'a peculiar source of the evil at which the [dis-
criminatory] statute is aimed' "328: that is, that Alaska's unemployment
problems were caused primarily by competition for jobs from non-res-
idents, rather than by the inadequate job training and geographical re-
moteness of its unemployed residents.329 In contrast, the state of
Hawaii could conceivably make a showing that non-resident migrants
are the chief cause of its unemployment problems.
321. The possible "natural resources" justification is discussed in the text accompanying
notes 155-166 supra.
322. See note 143 and accompanying text supra.
323. See notes 118-121 and accompanying text supra.
324. 46 U.S.L.W. at 4776. The Court at this juncture also clarified portions of its discussion
of the natural resources exception in Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 98 S. Ct. 1852 (1978), see
notes 163-164 and accompanying text rupra. The Court in Hicklin observed that the mere fact
that a state owns a resource does not mean that laws regulating the exploitation of that resource
need not conform to the restrictions of the privileges and immunities clause; such ownership is no
more than "a factor-although often the crucial factor--to be considered in evaluating whether
the statute's discrimination against noncitizens violates the Clause." 46 U.S.L.W. at 4776. This
conclusion was also said to be supported by the constitutional restrictions upon state interference
with interstate commerce which were said to "inform analysis under the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause as to the permissibility of the discrimination the State visits upon nonresidents based
on its ownership of the resource." Id. at 4777.
325. For a discussion of the constitutionality of imposing residency requirements to relieve
unemployment, see notes 110-117 and accompanying text supra.
326. 46 U.S.L.W. at 4775 (citing Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1870)-(held that
Maryland law imposing discriminatory license regulations upon non-residents who sold goods
within the city of Baltimore violated the privileges and immunities clause)).
327. Id. at 4776.
328. Id. at 4775 (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 398 (1948)).
329. Id. at 4775.
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On the other hand, the Court further determined that the Alaska
statute was constitutionally defective as a method of relieving unem-
ployment because it conferred upon "all Alaskans, regardless of their
employment status, education, or training, a flat employment prefer-
ence for all jobs covered by the Act. ' 330  As a result, it could not be
demonstrated that the policy of reducing the number of state residents
without jobs by compelling employers within the state to discriminate
against non-residents was a strategy "closely tailored to aid the unem-
ployed the Act is intended to benefit."'331 A similar objection might be
raised against Hawaii's act 101, which, like the Alaska Hire law, af-
fords an across-the-board grant of a job preference to state residents,
whether or not they are unemployed or in a job training program.
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court concluded its opinion in
Hicklin by reaffirming the philosophy of national unity that had earlier
been propounded by Justice Cardozo: "the Constitution 'was framed
upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim
together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union
and not division.' "332
No recent decision by the Supreme Court has more clearly re-
flected this philosophy of national unity than City of Philadelphia v.
State of New Jersey.333 With only Justice Rehnquist and the Chief
Justice dissenting, the Court held in this case that a New Jersey stat-
ute334 which prohibited cities located outside the state from depositing
their solid and liquid wastes at privately-owned New Jersey landfills
was an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.335 Finding
the New Jersey legislature's motives in adopting the restriction of no
constitutional significance-"it does not matter whether the ultimate
aim of. . . [the statute] is to reduce the waste disposal costs of New
Jersey residents or to save remaining open lands from pollution, for we
330. Id.
331. Id. at 4776. The Alaska Supreme Court had held a one-year residency requirement for
pipeline-related jobs invalid on the basis of a similar rationale. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 545 P.2d 159,
164-65 (Alaska 1977); see note 115 and accompanying text supra. Since this portion of its deci-
sion was premised in part on a construction of the state's constitution and thus rested in part on an
independent and adequate state ground, it was not cross-appealed. 46 U.S.L.W. at 4774 n.6.
332. 46 U.S.L.W. at 4777 (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935)).
333. 46 U.S.L.W. 4801 (U.S. June 23, 1978).
334. N.J. REV. STAT. § 13:11-10 (West Supp. 1977).
335. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The dissenters contended that the case was controlled
by prior decisions indicating that a state could prohibit the importation of infectious or noxious
commodities, even though such commodities were shipped through the channels of interstate com-
merce. 46 U.S.L.W. at 4805 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J.) (citing Bowman v.
Northwestern R.R. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 489 (1888)).
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assume that New Jersey has every right to protect its residents' pocket-
books as well as their environment '' 33 6-the Court concluded that the
local lawmakers could not ban disposal of out-of-state waste within the
boundaries of New Jersey while continuing to permit the disposal on its
landfills of equally deleterious in-state waste.337 To the dissenting jus-
tices' plaintive insistence that, "New Jersey must out of sheer necessity
treat and dispose of its solid waste in some fashion," 338 the majority
responded only with another forceful assertion of national unity:
Today, cities in Pennsylvania and New York find it expedient or
necessary to send their waste into New Jersey for disposal, and New
Jersey claims the right to close its borders to such traffic. To-
morrow, cities in New Jersey may fimd it expedient or necessary to
send their waste into Pennsylvania or New York for disposal, and
those States might then claim the right to close their borders. The
Commerce Clause will protect New Jersey in the future, just as it
protects her neighbors now, from efforts by one State to isolate itself
in the stream of interstate commerce from a problem shared by
all.
3 3 9
Some difficulty may be found in reconciling City of Philadelphia
with a number of the Supreme Court's other recent decisions. 340  How-
ever, because commerce clause objections can be raised against restric-
tions on the activities of out-of-state persons as well as the free flow of
commodities, 34 1 the views expressed by the seven-member majority in
City of Philadelphia indicate that efforts by Hawaii to deal with its pop-
ulation, environmental and unemployment problems by discriminating
against the citizens of other states will probably confront major consti-
tutional barriers. At the very least, the decision seems to support the
proposition that a state cannot impose restrictions on non-residents to
336. 46 U.S.L.W. at 4804. One possible basis for a distinction between economic and envi-
ronmental objectives is suggested in the text following note 170 supra.
337. Id. at 4804-4805. The majority rejected the dissent's argument that the challenged
statute was a legitimate quarantine law, pointing out that any danger to health arose not from the
movement of waste through the state but rather as a result of its disposal at landfill sites, at which
point the geographical origin of the waste was immaterial with respect to its disease-generating
characteristics. Id. at 4804.
338. Id. at 4806 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J.).
339. Id. at 4805.
340. See, e.g., County Bd. of Arlington County v. Richards, 98 S. Ct. 24 (1977), discussedin
text accompanying notes 137-139 supra; Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976),
discussed in notes 130-132 and accompanying text supra. However, the Court in City of
Philadelphia distinguished the Hughes case by characterizing it as a decision involving a state's
"power to spend funds solely on behalf of state residents and businesses. ... 46 U.S.L.W. at
4804 n.6.
341. See notes 167-169 and accompanying text supra. See also Hicklin v. Orbeck, 46
U.S.L.W. 4773, 4777 (U.S. June 22, 1978).
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achieve even its legitimate objectives without also exacting some sub-
stantial sacrifices from its own residents to achieve those same objec-
tives.342 Read more broadly, the decision may also mean that with
respect to the necessities of a decent and dignified life,3 -43 a state may
not treat citizens of other states any differently than its own citizens.
Thus, as Governor Ariyoshi suggested a year ago,344 a constitutional
amendment may be required for Hawaii to implement a protectionist
philosophy. The alternative, of course, would be for the state to adopt
innovative and stringent, but non-discriminatory, growth management
policies.
342. See note 124 and accompanying text supra.
343. See notes 25-75 and accompanying text supra.
344. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
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